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This paper estimates the effects of immigration on wages of native workers at the 
national U.S. level. Following Borjas (2003) we focus on national labor markets for 
workers of different skills and we enrich his methodology and refine previous estimates. 
We emphasize that a production function framework is needed to combine workers of 
different skills in order to evaluate the competition as well as cross-skill complementary 
effects of immigrants on wages. We also emphasize the importance (and estimate the 
value) of the elasticity of substitution between workers with at most a high school 
degree and those without one. Since the two groups turn out to be close substitutes, this 
strongly dilutes the effects of competition between immigrants and workers with no 
degree. We then estimate the substitutability between natives and immigrants and we 
find a small but significant degree of imperfect substitution which further decreases the 
competitive effect of immigrants. Finally, we account for the short run and long run 
adjustment of capital in response to immigration. Using our estimates and Census data 
we find that immigration (1990-2006) had small negative effects in the short run on 
native workers with no high school degree (-0.7%) and on average wages (-0.4%) while 
it had small positive effects on native workers with no high school degree (+0.3%) and 
on average native wages (+0.6%) in the long run. These results are perfectly in line with 
the estimated aggregate elasticities in the labor literature since Katz and Murphy (1992). 
We also find a wage effect of new immigrants on previous immigrants in the order of 
negative 6%. 
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There is a long tradition of ﬁnding small and often insigniﬁcant eﬀects of immigration on the wages of native
workers when analyzing cross-city and cross-state evidence in the US.1 Two recent inﬂuential contributions,
however, (Borjas, 2003; Borjas and Katz, 2007) have emphasized the importance of estimating immigration
eﬀects using national level U.S. data. In practice, this approach has found a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of
immigration on the wages of less educated natives, producing what has been considered a vindication of the
relative labor supply theory which predicts that the large inﬂow of less educated immigrants into the U.S. since
1980 should have reduced the relative wages of less educated natives. This paper reconsiders and extends the
national approach applied in Borjas (2003) and Borjas and Katz (2007) and demonstrates that the negative
eﬀects previously calculated are, to a large extent, the results of parameter restrictions not adopted in the rest
of the labor and macro literature and not supported by empirical evidence. In particular, the ﬁnding of a
large negative impact on wages of less educated immigrants is largely driven by an imprecise and, in our view,
erroneous estimate of the elasticity of substitution between workers with a high school degree and workers with
no degree. Moreover, in Borjas (2003) the failure to account for capital adjustment in the short run adds an
implausibly large negative eﬀect to native wages in the short run.
Our paper extends this so-called “national approach.” First, we produce and use a more plausible estimate
of the elasticity of substitution between workers with a high school degree and workers without one. Our
estimates of that elasticity are quite large, rather precise and in line with the practice of the rest of the labor
literature. Second, we identify a small but signiﬁcant degree of imperfect substitutability between native and
immigrant workers within the same education-experience group. This estimate revises and qualiﬁes the previous
estimates produced in Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008). We show that while very demanding speciﬁcations
such as the one used by Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) may produce insigniﬁcant values for the inverse
elasticity because of large standard errors, in most reasonable estimates (based on sample selection criteria
identical to theirs) the estimates of inverse elasticity are signiﬁcant and around 0.05. Finally, and in our view
most importantly, this article emphasizes the need for a general equilibrium approach based on a production
function that accounts for direct and cross-skill eﬀects of supply (immigration) on wages, as well as for capital
adjustment. It is impossible using national data and six census years only to estimate the within-group and
across-group eﬀects freely, that is without imposing some restrictions. In a model with a rich set of skills such
as the 32 education and experience groups used in Borjas (2003) and Borjas and Katz (2007) there would be
992 of those cross eﬀects and using Census data only 192 skill by year observations are available since 1960.
Hence, studies that do not explicitly describe the underlying structure of interactions are only able to estimate
the partial eﬀect of immigration within a group (for given supply in other groups) and not the actual eﬀect
1See the inﬂuential review by Friedberg and Hunt (1995) and since then Card (2001), Card and Lewis (2007) and Card (2007).
2of immigration on wages of native workers in each skill group. We show in section 6.1 how misleading it is to
apply the partial elasticity estimate when evaluating the aggregate eﬀect of immigration. Indeed, “[t]he labor
demand curve is downward sloping”, as Borjas (2003) puts it, but one should not forget that the demand for
each factor (type of workers) shifts when the supplies of other factors change.
The model that we propose adopts a widely used nested CES production function which allows us to combine
supply shocks aﬀecting workers of diﬀerent education and experience levels in order to identify wage eﬀects.
Two features of the production structure are important and widely accepted in the labor, macro and growth
literatures. First, workers are grouped into two labor aggregates, highly educated (H) and less educated (L),
and those are then combined into a labor aggregate (N) via a constant elasticity of substitution between the
two groups, σHL. Typically workers with at least some college education are included in the group of highly
educated and those with a high school education and less are in the other. Second, the labor aggregate (N)a n d
the capital stock (K) are combined in a Cobb-Douglas production function since there is abundant evidence
for the U.S. that the elasticity of substitution between them is one and that in the medium-to-long run capital
adjusts to increases in labor so as to maintain constant rates of return (in the balanced growth path) and a
constant capital-output ratio.
One could further diﬀerentiate workers by their education levels within the groups H and L. The literature,
however, generally assumes an inﬁnite elasticity of substitution between workers with no degree and those
with a high school degree (we will call this elasticity σLL) and also perfect substitutability between those with
some college education and college graduates (we will call their elasticity of substitution σHH). Given the
fundamental importance of these two parameters in determining the eﬀects of immigrants on the wages of less
and more educated workers, and given scant existing estimates of them, we devote some eﬀort to developing
reasonable estimates of their values. More common is to separate workers according to their experience level
within education groups (Card and Lemieux 2001, Welch 1979), allowing for imperfect substitutability across
them (with an elasticity of substitution across experience groups σEXP). A CES combination of experience
groups (nested within the education groups) can then be used to estimate the elasticities across groups. As
estimates of the parameters σHL,σHH,σLL and σEXP exist in the literature, one can adopt those estimates,
place them in the CES production function, and use the inﬂow of immigrants in each group to calculate the
eﬀects on wages of natives of diﬀerent education and experience levels. This is what we do in section 6.2, and
then we also use our own estimates of the relevant parameters (produced in section 5) and show that they are
remarkably similar to what is obtained using the parameters taken from the literature. Finally, the richness of
our model allows us to diﬀerentiate more precisely the eﬀect of immigration on wages of natives and previous
immigrants.
Our estimation strategy has new features that signiﬁcantly depart from Borjas (2003) and Borjas and Katz
3(2007), and this has important consequences for the eﬀects of immigration. First, using CPS data we estimate
a speciﬁc elasticity between high school graduates and workers with no high school degree and show that it
is rather high— in fact, much higher than the elasticity between college graduates and high school graduates.
Second, we identify and estimate the elasticity between natives and immigrants within education-experience
groups (σIMMI) and show that, while it is large, it is precisely estimated in many speciﬁcations (except the
most demanding in terms of dummies). In most cases it is around 20. We also conﬁrm the estimates found in
the literature for the elasticity of substitution between workers of diﬀerent experience groups within the same
education group.
After combining the high substitutability between workers with no high school degree and high school
graduates with the imperfect substitutability between natives and immigrants, the actual long run eﬀect of
immigration during the period 1990-2006 on wages of natives with no degree was very small, ranging between
-0.5% and +0.7%. Even in the short run (i.e., as of 2007) accounting for the sluggish adjustment of capital,
the negative impact of immigrants on wages of native workers with no degree was only -0.7%. The explanation
for such a small eﬀect on the group of less educated workers is intuitive. Immigration has been quite balanced
between workers with a high school degree or less (L) and workers with some college education or more (H)
but within the low education group (L) immigrants with no high school degree were a much larger share of
the group than immigrants with a high school degree. Given the estimated high substitutability between those
two types of workers (σLL is routinely assumed to be inﬁnity in the labor literature) the eﬀect of immigrants
is diluted to the whole L group rather than concentrated among workers with no high school degree. This
attenuates much of the competition eﬀect that is due to immigrants. In the aggregate it is hard to discern
any negative eﬀect of immigrants on native wages for less educated and even allowing for perfect substitution
between natives and immigrants we at most get a negative long-run eﬀect of -0.6% on their wages as response
to immigration 1990-2006.
At the same time, the estimated imperfect substitutability of natives and immigrants produces in the long
run a small positive eﬀect on wages of native workers with higher education (+0.5 to 1.0%), as well as on average
native wages (+0.6%). A simulation which assumes perfect substitutability between natives and immigrants
generates a wage loss for less educated U.S.-born workers of -0.6% or less over 16 years of immigration (1990-
2006). Our preferred simulations, using a small degree of imperfect substitution between natives and immigrants,
imply a small gain for the less educated natives (+0.3%), a positive eﬀect for native workers with some college
education or more (between +0.5 and 1%) and a positive average wage eﬀect for natives overall of around +0.5%
in the long run. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect (on the order of -5 to -8% depending on their education)
of new immigrants on the wages of previous immigrants. Two things reinforce our conviction of the validity of
our results. First, our simulated wage eﬀects on natives are perfectly consistent with previous estimates of the
4relative demand elasticities across education and experience groups in the labor literature. In fact, as we show
in section 6, very similar wage eﬀects for each education group could be obtained using our production function,
immigration as a supply shock and elasticity estimates taken exclusively from the previous labor literature (e.g.,
Katz and Murphy, 1992; Welch, 1979; Card and Lemieux, 2001). Moreover, the simulated wage eﬀects are
also consistent with the cross-city eﬀects of immigration estimated by most authors using the so-called “area
approach” (e.g., Card, 2001; Card and Lewis, 2007).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 frames this contribution within the existing
literature on the national eﬀects of immigration on wages and relates our model and estimates to the existing
labor literature on the eﬀects of diﬀerent kinds of labor supply and labor demand shocks. Section 3 presents in
detail the production function and the simple mechanism of adjustment of capital to labor supply. It derives the
eﬀects of immigration, considered as an increase in the supply of labor of diﬀerent types, on wages (marginal
productivity) of native and foreign-born workers of diﬀerent types and on average. Section 4 describes the
data, the criteria of sample selection and how we construct the main variables, and presents some summary
statistics and trends. Section 5 describes the empirical strategy and discusses the estimates of the crucial
elasticities (σIMMI,σ EXP,σ HL, σLL and σHH). Section 6 uses the estimated parameters to calculate the long
run and the short run eﬀect on wages of immigration over the period 1990-2006. We compare systematically our
simulation results with those obtained using parameter estimates from the previous labor literature and with
those obtained using the production function and estimates from Borjas (2003) and Borjas and Katz (2007).
We also compare our simulated eﬀects with those found using the cross-area analysis and reconcile the two
approaches. Section 7 provides some ﬁnal remarks.
2 Review of the Literature
This review is not exhaustive.2 There is a long list of contributions in the literature dealing with the impact of
immigrants on the wages of natives. Some of these studies explicitly consider the contribution of immigration
to increased wage dispersion and to the poor performance of real wages of the least educated since 1980. Two
questions are typically analyzed by the existing literature. The ﬁr s ti si m b u e dw i t ha“ m a c r o ”ﬂavor: Does the
inﬂow of foreign-born workers have a positive or negative net eﬀect on the average productivity and wages of
U.S.-born workers? This question requires that we aggregate the wages of heterogeneous workers. The second
question is more “micro” (or distributional) in focus: How are the gains and losses from immigration distributed
across U.S.-born workers (and previous immigrants) with diﬀerent levels of education? The consensus emerging
from the literature is that the ﬁrst (macro) eﬀect on average U.S. wages is negligible in the long run, as capital
2For a recent and articulate overview of the estimates of the eﬀect of immigration on wages see Longhi, Nijkamp and Poot
(2005).
5accumulates to restore the pre-migration capital-labor ratio. However, how long does it take to achieve the
long run capital adjustment? As for the eﬀects of immigration on the relative wages of more and less educated
U.S.-born workers, some economists argue for a large, adverse impact on less educated workers (Borjas, 1994,
1999, 2003; Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997; Borjas and Katz, 2007), while others favor a smaller, possibly
insigniﬁcant, eﬀect (Butcher and Card, 1991; Card, 1990; Card, 2001; Friedberg, 2001; Lewis, 2005; National
Research Council, 1997). The ﬁrst group of economists argues that most of the negative eﬀects are only identiﬁed
if one looks at national data, and are missed by the cross-area approach.3 They have therefore strongly advocated
analysis based on national labor markets.
This paper, in fact, is most closely related to three previous papers that focus exclusively on the national
market, specify a production function structure which combines workers of diﬀerent skills, estimate parameters
using national data, and then use these parameters to simulate the impact of immigration on wages. Those
papers are Borjas (2003), Borjas and Katz (2007) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006a). The novel contributions
of this paper relative to Borjas (2003) and Borjas and Katz (2007) are to consider carefully the mechanism of
capital adjustment, to estimate the elasticity between workers with a high school diploma and those without
a diploma, and to analyze the implications of imperfect substitutability between natives and immigrants. The
novelty relative to Ottaviano and Peri (2006a) is the more careful structure of nesting education groups, the
new estimates of the elasticity between workers with a high school diploma and those without a diploma (σLL)
and the more careful, theory-based approach to the estimate of imperfect substitution between natives and
immigrant workers (σIMMI). Let us add that in the last few years other studies have followed the lead of
Ottaviano and Peri (2006a) and estimated the parameter 1/σ IMMI within similar models for diﬀerent samples
and countries. Raphael (2008), using US data 1970-2005, Manacorda et al. (2005) using UK data, and D’Amuri
et al. (2008) using German data. These articles all ﬁnd small, but signiﬁcant values for 1/σ IMMI using
speciﬁcations similar to the one we use in this paper (with fewer dummies than in Ottaviano and Peri, 2006a).
Moreover, in the previous literature indirect evidence of imperfect substitution between natives and immigrants
was found in the form of small wage eﬀects of immigrants on natives and larger negative eﬀects on the wages of
previous immigrants (see Longhi, Nijkamp and Poot, 2005, page 468-469 for a discussion of this issue). Until
Ottaviano and Peri (2006a), however, only a very few studies explicitly estimated the elasticity of substitution
between natives and immigrants. Jaeger (1996) only covered metropolitan areas over 1980-1990, obtaining
estimates that may be susceptible to attenuation bias and endogeneity problems related to the use of local
data, and Cortes (2006), who considers low-skilled workers and uses metropolitan area data, ﬁnds a rather low
elasticity of substitution between U.S.- and foreign-born workers.
Two other branches of the labor literature also provide much needed background for this paper. The ﬁrst
3We will refer more systematically to other studies that estimate the eﬀect of immigrants on US wages across cities and states
in section 6.4, where we reconcile our results with those of the so-called “area approach.”
6branch is the one estimating the substitutability of workers with diﬀerent education levels and simulating the
impact of labor demand and supply shocks on wages. Beginning with Katz and Murphy (1992) and continuing
with Murphy and Welch (1992), Angrist (1995), Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), Johnson (1997), Krusell et al.
(2000) and Acemoglu (2002), economists have argued that in order to understand the impact of changes in the
supply and demand for labor on the wages of workers of diﬀerent education levels it is very helpful to consider
highly educated and less educated workers as imperfectly substitutable (with constant elasticity). Those studies
classiﬁed workers with some college education or more as highly educated and all others as less educated.
Appealing to its simplicity, this two-group structure has also been advocated on the basis of the observation
that the wages of workers within the same group (e.g., workers with no degree or with a high school degree)
seem to co-move much more than do the wages of workers in diﬀerent groups (such as high school graduates and
college graduates).4 Borjas(2003), Borjas and Katz (2007) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006a), however, opt for
four symmetric education groups combined in the CES (no degree, a high school diploma, some college and a
college degree). Logically, such a structure is harder to believe as it assumes symmetry among four groups that
have a natural ordering in their proximity, and it gives rise to very imprecise and often non-signiﬁcant estimates
of the elasticity 1/σ HL (see Borjas, 2003, page 1364 and Borjas and Katz, 2007, footnote 28). Moreover, this
four-group CES is not adopted by other articles that we know of in the labor literature. Hence we submit
it to closer scrutiny, allowing for four education groups but testing their elasticity of substitution in a nested
structure that can accommodate both the standard speciﬁcation (of two large groups and perfect substitution
within them) and the Borjas (2003) speciﬁcation (with four groups), which we then test against each other.
The other branch of the labor literature providing useful reference analyzes the eﬀect of age structure on
the experience premium. Katz and Murphy (1992) consider a simple two group, young-old structure and ﬁnd
an elasticity of substitution between them of around 3.3. Welch (1979) and Card and Lemieux (2001) use a
symmetric CES structure with several age groups and estimate elasticities between 5 and 10. While one could
also revisit the symmetric CES structure along the experience dimension, the issue of immigration and its impact
is much more focussed on the impact on the less educated (rather than of a particular age group). Since the
relevance of the parameter σEXP is much smaller in determining the impact across education groups we are
satisﬁed with reproducing the literature estimates in this case.
Finally, with respect to the treatment of physical capital, we explicitly consider its contribution to production
and treat its accumulation as driven by market forces which equalize its real returns in the long run. In particular,
we revise the usual approach that considers capital as ﬁxed in short run simulations (Borjas, 2003; Borjas and
Katz, 2007). The growth literature (Islam, 1995; Caselli, et al. 1996) and real business cycle literature (e.g.,
Romer, 2006, Chapter 4) have estimated, using annual data on capital accumulation and diﬀerent types of
4See, for instance, Katz and Murphy (1992), page 68.
7shocks, the speed of adjustment of capital to deviations from its long run growth path. Adopting 10% per
year as a reasonable estimate of the speed of adjustment of physical capital in the U.S. (conﬁrmed by our own
estimates for the 1960-2006 period) we analyze the impact of yearly immigration on average wages as capital
adjusts. We can evaluate the impact of immigration which occurred in the period 1990-2006 on average wages
as of 2007, and we can evaluate its eﬀects after ﬁve or ten more years.
3 Theoretical Framework
This paper treats immigration as a labor supply shock, omitting any productivity impact that it may produce
(due to improved eﬃciency, choice of better technologies or scale externalities) and therefore may miss part
of its positive impact on wages (identiﬁed often as a positive overall wage eﬀect in cross-city or cross-state
analyses such as Card, 2007, or Ottaviano and Peri 2005, 2006b). In order to evaluate the eﬀects of immigrants
on the wages of natives and other foreign-born workers with similar or diﬀerent education and experience we
need a model of how the marginal productivity of a given type of worker changes in response to changes in the
supply of other types. We also need to account for capital adjustment. This essentially amounts to assuming a
production function that parametrizes the elasticity of substitution between each type of worker and a simple
model of capital adjustment in the short and long run. Our goal is to rely on a model which is acceptable to
most economists. In particular, the structure of the labor market, the grouping of workers within skill cells,
the functional form that is assumed in aggregating diﬀerent skills and the elasticities of substitution used in
the model should be consistent with best practices in the recent labor literature. Similarly, the treatment of
substitutability between capital and labor and the adjustment of capital in the short and long run should be
compatible with best practices in the recent macro and growth literature.
3.1 Production Function
The aggregate production function we use is the very common and popular Cobb-Douglas aggregation, broadly





where Yt is aggregate output , At is exogenous total factor productivity (TFP), Kt is physical capital, Nt is a
CES aggregate of diﬀerent types of labor (described below), and α ∈ (0,1) is the income share of labor. All
variables, as indicated by the subscripts, are relative to year t. The production function is a constant returns to
scale (CRS) Cobb-Douglas combination of capital Kt and labor Nt. This functional form has been widely used
in the macro-growth literature (from Solow, 1956, to recent papers by Jones, 2005 and Caselli and Coleman,
82006) and is supported by the empirical observation that the share of income going to labor, α, is reasonably














where NHt and NLt are respectively aggregate measures of the labor supplied by workers with high (H)a n d
low (L)e d u c a t i o nl e v e l si ny e a rt,a n dθHt and θLt are productivity levels speciﬁc to workers with high and low
education (standardized so that θHt+θLt = 1 and any common multiplying factor can be absorbed in the TFP
term At). Finally, the parameter σHL is the elasticity of substitution between the two groups.
While the above speciﬁcation is clearly a simpliﬁcation, it is one that is broadly accepted and popular in
the literature and presents several advantages. Above all, the fact that estimates of the parameter σHL exist
in the literature allows us to potentially rely on those values to evaluate the eﬀects of immigration on wages
of workers with diﬀerent educational attainments. The consensus value for σHL is usually identiﬁed as 1.5.7
An important question is which level of education to include in each of the two groups. Most of the previous
studies either include among highly educated workers those with a college degree or more (Autor, Katz and
Krueger, 1998; Krusell et al., 2000), and leave all the other workers in the L group or they include workers
w i t hah i g hs c h o o ld e g r e eo rl e s si nt h eg r o u pL, place college graduates in the group H,a n ds p l i tw o r k e r sw i t h
some college nearly equally between the two groups (Katz and Murphy 1992; Card and Lemieux 2001; Welch
1979). At odds with both traditions, however, is the literature which uses the national approach to analyze the
impact of immigration (Borjas 2003; Borjas and Katz 2007; Ottaviano and Peri 2006a). These papers choose
a CES aggregator of 4 education groups (Some High School, High School Graduates, Some College, College
Graduates) with a common and identical elasticity of substitution across all groups equal to σEDU.R e s t r i c t i n g
the elasticity across the four education groups to be the same may be required in order to obtain an estimate of
σEDU w h e nu s i n gC e n s u sd a t a( d u et ot h ev e r yf e wo b s e r v a t i ons over time) but it is clearly suspicious. First,
the education groups are not “symmetric” since workers with no degree are clearly more similar to those with
a high school degree than to those with a college degree. Second, the existing estimates of σEDU in Borjas
(2003) and Borjas and Katz (2007) are so imprecise that they are consistent with any value of σEDU from 1.5 to
inﬁnity (more on this in section 5.3). Hence, rather than assuming either the speciﬁcation with four symmetric
groups or the more established two education group approach, we nest the four education group speciﬁcation
5The Cobb-Douglas functional form implies that physical capital has the same degree of substitutability with each type of
workers. Some inﬂuential studies (e.g. Krusell et al. 2001) have argued that phisical capital complements highly educated and
substitutes for less educated workers. Such an assumption, however, would imply, countrfactually, that the income share of capital
increased over time following the large increase in supply and income share of highly educated. This has not happened in the U.S.
over the period considered.
6This follows Katz and Murphy (1992), Autor Katz and Krueger (1997), Krusell et al. (2000), Card and Lemieux (2001),
Acemoglu (2002) and Caselli and Coleman (2006) among others.
7See section 5.3 for a detailed review of the estimates of σHL in the literature.
9used in Borjas (2003) into the more traditional two groups and use a production function which can encompass


























The terms Nkt for k ∈ {SHS,HSG,SCO,COG} are aggregate measures of labor supplied by workers
with, respectively, some high school education (SHS), a high school diploma (HSG), some college education
(SCO) and a college degree (COG). The parameters θkt capture the relative productivity of those groups of
workers within the aggregates NLt and NHt. The elasticities of substitution σLL and σHH capture, respectively,
the degree of substitutability between workers with no high school degree and with a high school degree in
expression (3) and the substitutability between workers with some college education and those with a college
degree in expression (4). The nested structure above allows for, as speciﬁc cases, the more common two-group
CES (for σLL= σHH = ∞ and 0 <σ HL < ∞) or the four-group Borjas (2003) CES (obtained for σLL=
σHH = σHL = σEDU).8 The estimate of the parameter σLL, as we will see, is extremely relevant in determining
the eﬀect of immigration on the wages of workers with no high school degree. However, there are no speciﬁc
estimates of it in the literature and the common practice is to assume it is equal to ∞ and to aggregate workers
with a high school degree or less together (usually weighted by diﬀerent units of eﬀective labor). We need,
however, to collect more evidence on this parameter before accepting the assumption σLL = ∞ (used in most
of the literature) rather than σLL= σHH = σHL (preferred in Borjas 2003) and our structure allows us to do
so using CPS data and the method used by Katz and Murphy (1992) (see section 5.3).
We then assume that within each Nkt are workers with diﬀerent experience levels, who are also imperfect
















where j is an index spanning experience intervals of ﬁve years between 0 and 40, so that j = 1 captures workers
with 1 − 5 years of experience, j =2t h o s ew i t h6− 10 years, and so on. The parameter σEXP > 1m e a s u r e s
the elasticity of substitution between workers in the same education group but with diﬀerent experience levels
and θkj are experience-education speciﬁc productivity levels (standardized so that
P
j θkj =1f o re a c hk and
8The nested case assumes a split between H and L that includes all workers with some college among highly educated. This is
slightly diﬀerent from the tradition of dividing them between the two groups and we will check empirically that it does not make
al a r g ed i ﬀerence in the estimate of σHL. A split of workers with some college between the two groups would further reduce the
eﬀect of immigration on wages.
10assumed invariant over time, as in Borjas, 2003, Borjas and Katz , 2007, and Ottaviano and Peri, 2006a). The
parameter σEXP is the elasticity of substitution between workers with the same education level and diﬀerent
experience. Finally, speciﬁc to the immigration literature and ﬁrst introduced by Ottaviano and Peri (2006a),
we deﬁne Nkjt as a CES aggregate of U.S.-born (domestic, D) and foreign-born (F) workers. Denoting the
supply of labor by workers with education k and experience j who are, respectively, U.S.-born (Domestic) or














The terms θHkjt and θFkjt measure the speciﬁc productivity levels (relative quality) of foreign- and U.S.-born
workers. They may vary across education-experience groups but (as with the θkj above) they are assumed to be
invariant over time. They are standardized so that (θHkj + θFkj)=1 . Foreign-born workers are likely to have
diﬀerent abilities pertaining to language, quantitative skills, relational skills and so on. These characteristics,
in turn, are likely to aﬀect their choices regarding occupations and jobs, therefore foreign-born workers might
be diﬀerentiated enough to be imperfect substitutes for U.S.-born workers, even within the same education and
experience group.
3.2 Physical Capital Adjustment
Physical capital adjustment in response to immigration may not be immediate. However, investors respond
continuously to inﬂows of labor and to the consequent increase in the marginal productivity of capital; how fast
they respond is an empirical question. Further, immigration is not an unexpected and instantaneous shock. If
we deﬁne the short run eﬀect as the impact of immigration given a ﬁxed capital stock, we can ask: for how
long is capital ﬁxed and why? Immigration is an ongoing phenomenon, distributed over years, predictable
and rather slow. Despite the acceleration in legal and illegal immigration after 1990, the inﬂow of immigrants
measured less than 0.6% of the labor force each year between 1960 and 2006. In a dynamic context the relevant
parameter in order to evaluate the impact of immigration on average wages is the speed of adjustment of capital.
In the long run, on the balanced growth path such as in the Ramsey (1928) or the Solow (1956) models, the
variable ln(Kt/Nt) follows a constant positive trend growth determined only by the growth rate of total factor
productivity (lnAt) and unaﬀected by the size of Nt. Therefore the average wage in the economy, which depends
on Kt/Nt, does not depend on immigration in the long run. Shocks to Nt, such as immigration, however, may
temporarily aﬀect the value of Kt/Nt, causing it to be below its long run trend. How much and for how long
ln(Kt/Nt) remains below trend as a consequence of immigration depends on the yearly inﬂow of immigrants and
11on the yearly rate of adjustment of physical capital. The theoretical and empirical literature on the speed of
convergence of a country’s capital per worker to its own balanced growth path (Islam, 1995; Caselli et al. 1996),
as well as the business cycle literature on capital adjustment (see Romer, 2006, Chapter 4.7), provide estimates
for this speed of adjustment that we can use together with data on yearly immigration to obtain the eﬀect of
immigration over 1990-2006 on average wages in 2007 and in the subsequent years as capital continues to adjust.
We devote the next section, 3.2.1, to showing in detail the connection between average wages and the capital-
labor ratio. In analyzing the simulated eﬀects of immigrants we ﬁrst focus on the long run eﬀects (Section 6.2),
allowing for full capital adjustment, as a natural reference. Then in Section 6.3 we use the estimated speed of
capital adjustment (from the macro literature) to show the eﬀect of sixteen years of immigration (1990-2006)
on wages as of the year 2007, and we then compare those results with the traditional way of computing “short
run” eﬀects on wages.
3.2.1 Partial Adjustment, Total Adjustment and Wages
Given the production function in (1) the eﬀect of physical capital Kt on the wages of individual workers operates
through the eﬀect on the marginal productivity of the aggregate Nt. Let us call wN
t the compensation to the
composite factor Nt, which is equal to the average wage in the economy9. In a competitive market it equals the











Assuming either international capital mobility or capital accumulation along the balanced growth path of
the Ramsey (1928) or Solow (1956) models, the real interest rate r and the aggregate capital-output ratio
Kt/Yt are both constant in the long run and the capital-labor ratio Kt/Nt grows at a constant rate equal to
1
α times the growth rate of technology At. This assertion is also supported in the data, and is particularly
true for our period of consideration, 1960-2006. As depicted in Figure 1 the capital-output ratio (Kt/Yt)s h o w s
small deviations around a constant mean over the 46 years considered. And there is no evidence that in the
period of fastest immigration (1990-2006) the ratio systematically deviated from its average. Moreover, the log
capital-labor ratio, ln(Kt/Nt), shown in Figure 2 exhibits remarkably fast reversion to its long run trend (also
shown in ﬁgure 2), as evidenced by the fact that the path of thev a r i a b l ec r o s s e st h et r e n de l e v e nt i m e si nt h e
sample. And again, there is no systematic evidence of a downward departure from the trend in the 1990-2006
period10.I no r d e rt os h o wt h ee ﬀect of diﬀerent patterns of capital adjustment on the average wage (wN
t )i ti s
useful to write the capital stock as Kt = κtNt,w h e r eκt is the capital-labor ratio. Hence wN
t (from equation
9T h e“ a v e r a g ew a g e ”wN
t is obtained by averaging the wages of each group (by education, skill and nativity), weighting them
by the share of the group in the total labor supply.
10We analyze the capital data and their dynamic behavior empirically in Section 6.3.
12(7)) can be expressed in the following form:
wN
t = αAt (κt)
1−α (8)
Calculating the marginal productivity of capital and equating it to the interest rate r, augmented by capital

























t , does not depend on the total supply of workers Nt. Hence, in the short run, the change in
labor supply due to immigration aﬀects average wages only if (and by the amount that) it aﬀects the capital-labor
ratio. Assuming that technological progress (∆At/At) is exogenous to the immigration process, the percentage
change in average wages due to immigration can be expressed as a function of the percentage response of κt to












where (∆κt/κt)immigration is the percentage deviation of the capital-labor ratio from κ∗
t due to immigration.
With full capital adjustment and the economy on the balanced growth path, (∆κt/κt)immigration equals 0.
At the same time, if one assumes ﬁxed total capital, Kt = K, then (∆κt/κt)immigration equals the negative
percentage change of labor supply due to immigration: −∆Ft
Nt ,w h e r e∆Ft is the increase in labor supply due to
foreign-born workers in the period considered and Nt is the aggregate labor supply at the beginning of the period.
In the obviously counterfactual case in which we keep capital unchanged over sixteen years of immigration, 1990-
2006, the inﬂow of immigrants increases the amount of hours worked by 11.4% of its total value in 1990. This,
combined with a capital share (1−α)e q u a lt o0 .33, implies a negative eﬀect on average wages of 3.8 percentage
points. Accounting for the sluggish yearly response of capital and for yearly immigration ﬂows, however, we can
estimate the actual response of the capital-labor ratio to immigration ﬂows in the 1990-2006 period, without
the extreme assumption that capital be ﬁxed for 16 years. We do this in Section 6.3 when we revisit the short
and long run eﬀects of immigration on wages.
3.3 Eﬀects of Immigration on Wages
We use the production function (1) to calculate the demand functions and wages for each type of labor at a given
point in time. Choosing output as the numeraire good, in a competitive equilibrium the (natural logarithm of)
the marginal productivity of U.S.-born workers (D) equals (the natural logarithm of) their wage. Denoting the
broad education level with b ∈ B ≡ {H,L}, the speciﬁc education level with k ∈ E ≡ {SHS,HSG,SCO,COG}













































































where Dkjt (Fkjt) represents the total labor input (hours worked) of male and female U.S.-born (foreign-born)
workers of education k (in broad group b) and experience j and wDbkjt (wFbkjt ) represents the average wage
of the group. We assume that the relative eﬃciency parameters, represented by the θ’s, as well as total factor
productivity At, depend on technological factors and are independent of the supply of foreign-born.
Given (10) and (11), the overall impact of immigration on natives with education k and experience j can






and four eﬀects that
operate through Nkjt, Nkt,N btand Nt. The corresponding expressions are reported in Appendix A. Here we
p r o v i d et h eb a s i ci n t u i t i o n . F i r s t ,t h e r ei st h ep o s i t i v eo v e r a l le ﬀect of immigration on the productivity of
workers in group b,k,j due to increased supply of all types of labor: a worker, whether native or immigrant,
beneﬁts from the increase in aggregate labor supply thanks to imperfectly substitutability among diﬀerent types
of workers. This eﬀect operates through 1
σHL ln(Nt). Second, there is the eﬀect on marginal productivity gen-
erated by the supply of immigrants within the same broad education group (but diﬀerent speciﬁc education






ln(Nbt). It is negative if workers with similar
broad education are closer substitutes than workers with diﬀerent broad education (σbb >σ HL). Third, there







ln(Nkt). It is negative if workers with similar education-experience are more substi-
tutable than workers with the same education but diﬀerent experience level (σEXP >σ bb). Finally, while in
(10) the stock of native workers Dkjt is unaﬀected by immigration, there is still an additional negative eﬀect
of immigrants on the wages of foreign born workers through − 1
σimmi ln(Fkjt) in (11), which takes into account
the fact that foreign-born workers may not be perfect substitutes for U.S.-born workers with equal skills and
education.
Notice that the wages of native workers in group b,k,j are aﬀected by a direct partial eﬀect of immigrants in
their same education-experience group plus 56 other cross-eﬀects produced by immigrants in other groups and
14a capital-adjustment term. The direct partial eﬀect, in fact, can be thought of as measuring the wage impact,
keeping constant the aggregate supplies Nt,N bt and Nkt. Such eﬀects have been estimated, for instance, in
sections II to VI of Borjas (2003) by regressing the wage of natives ln(wHkjt) on the labor supply of immigrants
in the same skill group b,k,j in a panel across groups and over census years, controlling for year-speciﬁc
eﬀects (absorbing the variation of Nt) and education-by-year speciﬁce ﬀects (absorbing the variation of Nbt and
Nkt). The resulting partial elasticity, expressed as the percentage variation of native wages (∆wDbkjt/wDbkjt)





















where sFbkjt is the share of overall wages paid in year t to foreign-born workers in education group b, subgroup
k, with experience j. Analogously, sbkjt is the share of the total wage bill in year t accounted for by all workers
in education group b, subgroup k a n dw i t he x p e r i e n c ej. Hence, by construction, the elasticity ε
partial
kjt captures







While this term is likely to be negative (if σIMMI >σ EXP), its value is clearly uninformative about the eﬀect
of overall immigration on the wages of native workers within the skill group. In fact, the total eﬀect depends
not only on the changes in the capital stock but also on the increased relative labor supply of all education and
experience cells as well as on all the cross elasticities (σHL,σ bb, σEXP, σIMMI). “The labor demand curve is
downward sloping” (Borjas, 2003) in each cell, but it shifts when the supplies of other imperfectly substitutable
factors change.
4 Data, Variables and Sample Description
A detailed description of the data, the exact speciﬁcation of the samples and a step-by-step account of how
each variable has been constructed can be found in Appendix B11.T h ev a r i a b l ed e ﬁnitions, construction and
sample selection coincide exactly with those in Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008). The data we use are from
the integrated public use microdata samples (IPUMS) of the U.S. Decennial Census and from the American
Community Survey (Ruggles et al., 2008). In particular, we use the general 1% sample for Census 1960, the 1%
State Sample, Form 1, for Census 1970, the 5% State sample for the Censuses 1980 and 1990, the 5% Census
Sample for year 2000 and the 1% sample of the American Community Survey (ACS) Sample for the year 2006.
The large size of the samples ensures a high level of precision in estimating our variables in each year. Since
11The STATA codes used to perform selection of samples, construction-averaging of variables by cell and all
the regressions and simulations contained in this paper are available with detailed explanations at the website:
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gperi/codesOP2008.htm
The authors encourage interested researchers to use them duefully acknowledging the source.
15they are all weighted samples we use the variable “personal weight” to produce the average and aggregate
statistics below. Following the Katz and Murphy (1992) tradition we construct two somewhat diﬀerent samples
to produce measures of hours worked (or employment) by cell and average wages by cell. The employment
sample is more inclusive as it aims at including all the hours worked in each education-experience-nativity (and
sometimes gender) cell. It contains people aged 18 and older in the census year12 not living in group quarters,
who worked at least one week in the previous year.
To construct the measure of hours worked in each cell and year these workers are grouped into four school-
ing groups, eight experience groups and two nativity (US- and foreign-born) groups.13 Schooling groups are
constructed using the variable EDUCREC which classiﬁes levels of education consistently across censuses and
ACS data. The four groups identiﬁed are: individuals with no high school degree, high school graduates, indi-
viduals with some college education and college graduates. We deﬁne years of experience as years of potential
experience. They are calculated using the variable “AGE” and with the assumption that people without a high
school degree enter the labor force at age 17, people with a high school degree enter at 19, people with some
college enter at 21 and people with a college degree enter at 23. Then we select only workers with experience
of at least one year and less than or equal to forty years.14 We group workers into eight ﬁve-year experience
intervals beginning with those with 1 to 5 years of experience and ending with those with 36 to 40 years of
experience. The status of “foreign-born” is given to those workers who are non-citizens or are naturalized
citizens (using the variable “CITIZEN” since 1970 and ”BPL” in 1960). The hours of labor supplied by each
worker are calculated by multiplying hours worked in a week by weeks worked in a year (see Appendix B for
the exact deﬁnition and computational procedure) and individual hours are multiplied by the individual weight
(PERWT) and aggregated within each education-experience group. This measure of hours worked by cell is the
basic measure of labor supply. We also calculate (and alternatively use) the employment (count of employed
people) by cell (summing up the personal weights for all people).
To construct the average wage in each cell we use a more selective sample since we want to be sure that
we are measuring the correct average “price of labor” in the cell. Hence, from the employment sample we
eliminate workers who do not report wages (or report 0 wages) and those who are self-employed (since it is hard
to separate labor and non-labor income). In a second and more restrictive wage sample (used to produce the
estimates of Table 3) we also eliminate workers still enrolled in school. The average weekly wage in a cell is
constructed by calculating the real weekly wages of individuals (equal to annual salary and income, INCWAGE,
deﬂated using the CPI and adjusted in its topcodes as described in Appendix B, divided by weeks worked
12While sixteen years of age is the cut-oﬀ chosen by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for those people who are deﬁned as “working
age” we choose the cut-oﬀ at eighteen (corresponding to seventeen in the census year) to conform with Borjas, Grogger and Hanson
(2008).
13We also consider, in the regression analysis, cells with only male, only female or pooled male and female individuals. The
summary statistics and the aggregate trends in this section are provided for the pooled sample of males and females together.
14This selection eliminates a sizeable group of young and old individuals with experience of 0 years or less (due to a misclassiﬁcation
of their initial age of work) and 41 or more.
16in a year) and averaging them for each cell using weights equal to the hours worked by the individual times
her personal weight. This is our preferred method to calculate wages because it includes wages of all workers,
including part-time workers who constitute a large group in some cells, but weights their contribution to the
average wage by their labor supply (hours worked).
The procedure described above allows us to construct the variables Dbkjt,F bkjt, (hours worked) and wDbkjt,
wFbkjt (average weekly wages) for domestic and foreign-born workers of each education level (in group b and
subgroup k), experience level (j)a n dy e a rt (1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2006). Those are the basic variables
used in the empirical analysis when estimating the elasticity parameters (section 5) and when simulating the
eﬀects of immigration (section 6). These variables also allow us to construct sNbkjt and κNbkjt,t h es h a r eo f
each group in the total wage bill and in total hours worked for each represented year t. When estimating the
production-function parameters (σHL, σHH, σLL,σEXP and σIMMI)w ea l w a y su s et h ee n t i r ep a n e lo fd a t a ,
1960-2006. When we simulate the eﬀects of immigration on real wages, using those estimates, we focus on the
most recent period, 1990-2006. Before proceeding with the econometric analysis, let us present some salient
features of the immigration and wage data and some informative trends and summary statistics.
Table 1 reports the percentage increase in hours worked due to immigrants (column 3) and the percentage
change in weekly wages of natives (column 4) for each education-experience group over the period 1990-2006
pooling men and women together. This period is the most recent available in the data and the one on which we
focus our simulations. One can see in Table A1 in the Table Appendix the evolution of immigrant labor supply
(expressed as a percentage of hours worked) in each education-experience group over all the years considered
(from 1960 to 2006). Also, Table A2 in the Table Appendix shows the real value (in 2000 constant U.S. $) of
weekly wages for U.S.-born workers in each group between 1960 and 2006 and Table A3 reports the ratio of
immigrant to native weekly wages for each skill group and year in the entire sample.
Even a cursory look at the values in Column 3 of Table 1 reveals that the inﬂow of immigrants has been
uneven across groups. Focussing on the rows marked “All Experience Groups”, in each of the four detailed
educational groups we notice that the group of workers with no high school degree experienced the largest
percentage increase in hours worked due to immigrants over the 1990-2006 period (equal to +23.6%) followed
by the group of college graduates (+14.6%), while high school graduates and the group of workers with some
college education experienced only a 10% and 6% increase, respectively, in hours worked due to immigrants.
Interestingly, however, such imbalances are drastically reduced if we consider the broad educational categories
corresponding to highly educated (H)a n dl e s se d u c a t e d( L) in the model above. When we merge workers
with a high school degree or less (see the row in the middle of Table 1) immigrant labor accounts for only a
13.2% increase in hours worked (1990-2006). This is because the group of high school graduates received few
immigrants and the group of workers with no high school degree constitutes only a very small share of the
17total labor supply (only 8% of total hours worked in 2006 are supplied by workers with no degree versus 30%
by workers with a high school degree). In comparison, the group of workers with some college education or a
college degree experienced, during the same period, a 10% increase in hours worked because of immigrants (last
row of Table 1). It is clear already from these numbers that the substitutability between the group of workers
with no degree and those with a high school degree will be crucial in determining how much of the competition
eﬀect of immigrants on wages remains localized to the group of workers with no degree (for which immigrants
constituted a relevant relative supply shock) and how much is diﬀused to the group of workers with at most a
high school degree (for which immigration did not represent much of a relative supply shock).
Column 4 of Table 1 shows the percentage change of real weekly wages in each education-experience group
between 1990 and 2006. A cursory comparison of columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 suggests that it would be hard to
ﬁnd a negative correlation between increases in the share of immigrants and the real wage changes of natives
across the detailed education groups. The group of workers with no high school degree received an increase in
labor supply due to immigrants two to three times larger (in percentage terms) than the group of high school
graduates or college dropouts, and the wage performance of the ﬁrst group (-3.1%) is somewhat worse than
the performance of the other two (-1.2% and -1.9%, respectively). However, the group of college graduates
received the second largest increase in labor supply due to immigrants (+14.6%) and experienced by far the
best wage performance (+9.6%). In fact, looking more closely at the performance of the group of workers with
no degree, their negative wage performance seems to be exclusively due to the large, negative wage changes
within the group of workers with more than 30 years of experience (who experienced a negative 9% change
in their real wage). This group, however, received a relatively small inﬂow of immigrants (14.3 and 21.9%)
compared to other experience groups with no high school degree some of which experienced more than 30%
increase in size because of immigration. A look at Figures 3 and 4 conveys the same information in a more
compact way. Figure 3 summarizes graphically the percentage increase in labor supply due to immigration in
eight education-experience groups and Figure 4 shows the real wage change for the same groups, also during the
1990-2006 period. Rather than demonstrating a negative correlation of immigration and wages across education
groups, which would produce two histograms that are mirror images of one another (one U-shaped and the
other hump-shaped), the two charts suggest a possible positive association between the variables for education
groups above high school and no association at all for the two histograms as a whole.
Obviously these partial and raw correlations do not reveal much about the actual eﬀect of immigration on
wages. It is time to use our model to estimate the crucial elasticities across groups of workers and calculate
how much of the real wage variation observed in the data can be explained by changes in labor supply due
to immigrants. In terms of the education groups described in this section the natural questions arising are:
(i) How much of the negative performance in the wage of native dropouts in the 1990-2006 period was due to
18immigration within that group? (ii) How much of the college-high school dropout wage gap widening was due
to immigration? (iii) Was there any eﬀect of immigration on overall average wages of U.S.-born workers? We
will address these questions in Section 6 below.
5 Parameter Estimates
5.1 Estimates of σIMMI
We begin with the estimation of the elasticity of substitution between smaller groups in the CES and pro-
gressively we aggregate those up to estimate elasticity between the larger aggregates. At the lowest level,
foreign-born and natives are combined within each education-experience group with an elasticity of substitution
equal to σIMMI. This parameter, ﬁrst estimated in Ottaviano and Peri (2006a) has attracted a lot of attention
and recent studies have produced estimates of it for the U.K. (Manacorda et al., 2006), for Germany (D’Amuri
et al., 2008; Felbermayr, Geis and Kohler, 2008) and Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) have re-estimated it
for the U.S. Further evidence of imperfect substitution between native and foreign-born workers comes from a
long list of studies in the past that found larger negative eﬀects (within skill groups) of immigration on wages
of previous immigrants relative to wages of native workers,15 while several anecdotal stories as well as rigorous
empirical evidence (see Ottaviano and Peri 2006a and Peri and Sparber 2008) emphasize that immigrants choose
diﬀerent occupations and jobs from natives and have diﬀerent skills (manual versus language) even within similar
education and age groups.
While the original Ottaviano and Peri (2006a) estimate of 1
σIMMI was probably too large we think that
there is enough indirect and direct evidence of imperfect substitution16 to deserve a careful second look at
the Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) estimates. This is important because even small degrees of imperfect
substitution (as we will see in section 6) imply non-trivial diﬀerences on the eﬀect of immigrants on wages of
natives and previous immigrants. Moreover Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006a)
ﬁnd relatively large standard errors and impose very demanding controls (in the form of sets of dummies) in
the estimates of 1
σIMMI. Such a large set of dummies is not justiﬁed by the theoretical framework used, nor is
it in line with the procedure used to estimate the other elasticities of the model.
We proceed as follows. Taking the diﬀerence between expression (10) and expression (11) we obtain equation
(13) below that provides the basis for the estimation of 1
σIMMI:
15See, for instance, Grossman (1982) page 599, and Card (2001), Table 7. Longhi et al. (2005) summarize the literature and,
considering nine previous studies using U.S. data, conclude that “...immigrants have a signiﬁcantly bigger depressing eﬀect on wages
of other immigrants than on natives’ wages” (page 468-69).
16A recent paper by Raphael and Smolensky (2008) also estimates 1
σIMMI for the U.S. ﬁnding a signiﬁcant value in most cases.









where wFbkjt/wDbkjt is the relative wage of immigrants and U.S.-born workers in education group k (within
broad group b), experience group j and period t; Fkbjt/Dkbjt measures the relative hours worked by the two
groups and
θFkj
θDkj is the relative foreign-native productivity. Notice that in line with what is described in the
model, it is reasonable to assume that
θFkj
θDkj varies across education-experience group but that it is constant
over time. There are two very good reasons for this. First, remember that while technology aﬀects the relative
productivity of education (and experience) groups in diﬀerent ways over time, such diﬀerences are absorbed
by the θ
0s in the higher levels of the production function nesting. In equation (13) as we use ratios of wages
and hours worked within education-experience-period groups one can allow technology to be speciﬁct oe a c h
education-experience-year and those speciﬁc terms all cancel out leaving only the relative “productivity” of
immigrants and natives ln(
θFkj
θDkj). Second, the restriction of constant ln(
θFkj
θDkj) is perfectly in line with (in fact it
is less restrictive than) the assumption made at the higher level of CES nesting. For instance the experience-
speciﬁc productivity terms θkj are assumed to be constant over time. This is the assumption made in section
5.2 below as well as in Borjas (2003) (see section VII.A of the paper) and in Borjas and Katz (2007) (see section
1.4 of the paper) to estimate the elasticity σEXP. In our interpretation the term
θFkj
θDkj captures mostly the
relative labor eﬀectiveness (quality) of foreign-born versus natives. While we have reasons to believe that it
may be related to the education-experience of the group it is much less clear that this changes systematically







Where Ikj are 32 education by experience ﬁxed eﬀects and ukbjt is a group-speciﬁc error term. In the
basic speciﬁcations (denoted as “basic”) reported in Column (2) of Tables 2 and 3 we treat the error ukbjt as
potentially correlated within education-experience groups (hence the clustering of the standard errors) but with
no other systematic component. To capture potential systematic changes of the relative productivity of foreign
workers over time in the speciﬁcations reported in in column (3) of Table 2 and 3 (with the title “Add Time
Eﬀects”) we allow also for a time-speciﬁce ﬀect (It). If the systematic change in quality is due mostly to new
immigrants (who have low levels of experience) one can think that we should include a systematic experience
by time component (Ijt) and we do this in speciﬁcations of column (4) of Tables 2 and 3 labelled “Add Time
by Experience eﬀects”. Finally, if the change in quality of young, less experienced immigrants over time is also
systematically related to their education groups one can also include education by time eﬀects (Ikt). We include
20all the interactions in the speciﬁcations of column (5) in Table 2 and 3 labelled as “Add Time by Education
Eﬀects”. This last speciﬁcation is identical to those estimated in Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) and in
column (6) we report their exact estimates of 1
σIMMI for the corresponding speciﬁcations, where available.
The problem of speciﬁcations in columns (5) and (6) is that the extremely large number of dummies (104)
absorbs a very large part of the identifying variation (based on 192 observations at most). This causes a 3-4 fold
increase in the standard errors (relative to the basic speciﬁcation), reducing our ability to identify precisely the
parameter. More importantly, such extreme saturation using dummies, when the variables are already ratios
(rather than levels) within a cell, is a much more demanding method than what is applied to estimate any other
elasticity in the model. We illustrate in section 5.2 and 5.3 below that the same issue applies to the estimate of
the other inverse elasticities of the model, 1
σEXP and 1
σEDU : saturating the variation in the education-year and
experience-year dimensions with dummies makes the estimates insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.
Before commenting on the regression results, reported in Tables 2 and 3, it is very useful to take a look at
the data to see that the relative immigrant-native wages show a very clear negative correlation with the relative
immigrant-native hours worked across groups and decades, the clear sign of imperfect substitution. Figure 5
simply shows the scatterplot of ln(wFbkjt/wDbkjt)a n dl n ( Fkbjt/Dkbjt)d e ﬁn e da b o v ea n dt h ev e r ys i g n i ﬁcantly
n e g a t i v er e g r e s s i o nl i n e( t h ec o e ﬃcient is equal to 0.05, and the robust standard error, clustered by group, is
equal to 0.007). Figure 6 shows the scatterplot once we subtract from each skill group the estimated ﬁxed eﬀect
Ikj. The changes over time (relative to a group-speciﬁc average) of the relative immigrant-native hours supplied
and weekly wages appear even more signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with each other (the coeﬃcient is equal
to -0.06 and the robust standard error, clustered by group, is 0.008). The negative and signiﬁcant correlation,
very apparent from the data is “prima facie” evidence of imperfect substitution. The elasticity implied by such
coeﬃcients is around 20 and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from ∞. Finally, even a very simple look at the data in Tables
A1 and A3 conﬁrms that groups experiencing large increases in the share of foreign-born (e.g. all workers with
no degree and experience between 10 and 30 years) also underwent a signiﬁcant deterioration in the wage of
foreign-born relative to nationals.
Table 2 reports the estimated values of 1
σIMMI using our basic wage and employment sample (described in
section 4) and speciﬁcations that include an increasing set of control dummies. As described above, beginning
with speciﬁcation (1) which does not include any dummy, we add education by experience eﬀects (exactly as
speciﬁed in expression 14) in speciﬁcation (2). In speciﬁcation (3) we add time eﬀects, in (4) we also include
time by experience eﬀects and in (5) we add time by education eﬀects. The ﬁrst row includes only men, the
s e c o n do n l yw o m e na n dt h et h i r dm e na n dw o m e np o o l e di nt h ec a l c u l a t i o no ft h er e l a t i v ew a g e s . A sm e n
and women may have diﬀerent productive characteristics and diﬀer in their attachment to the labor market
it is traditional in this literature to prefer samples of men only. Our regressions show similar results when
21using either gender or a pooled sample. In the fourth row the method of estimation is 2SLS and the relative
foreign-native employment in the group is used as instrument for relative hours worked, to reduce the potential
endogeneity of hours worked to wage compensation. In the ﬁfth row we restrict the sample to 1970-2006, as the
share of foreign-born in employment only started increasing in the seventies. The sixth row shows the estimates
obtained using only groups with high school education or less, the seventh row restrict the sample to the groups
of workers with 20 years of experience or less.
Three robust results emerge from Table 2. First, all the full-sample speciﬁcations in columns (1) to (4)
produce highly signiﬁcant estimates of − 1
σIMMI ranging between -0.024 and -0.095 and mostly around -0.05,
implying an elasticity σIMMI = 20. Second, the standard errors (robust and clustered by education-experience
group) of those speciﬁcations in columns (1)-(4), including the whole sample (rows one to ﬁve), are generally
below 0.015 and in the basic speciﬁcations (column 2) they are smaller or equal to 0.012. In contrast, the
speciﬁcations that include all dummies (column 5) produce errors mostly larger then 0.03, and usually three
to four times larger than for the basic speciﬁcation. The estimates in Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) are
shown in column (6) next to our corresponding estimates (column 5). The only very minor diﬀerences between
the two estimates (leading to very small numerical discrepancies) reside in our use of a simpler cell-size weighting
(number of observations) in the regression (rather than the slightly more sophisticated weighting used in Borjas,
Grogger and Hanson, 2008) and in the fact that we ﬁrst take the average of cell wages to calculate wFbkjt/wDbkjt
and then apply the logarithm (consistent with the theoretical model) to that ratio. Borjas, Grogger and Hanson
(2008) take the average of logarithmic individual wages of native and immigrants in each cell, instead, and then
subtract one from the other17. Comparing the Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) estimates with the others in
the same row it is clear that the large standard errors and insigniﬁcant estimates in their paper are a result of
the saturation with dummies. While it is hard to determine which set of dummies capture important demand
shocks, and to decide which set to include, we want to emphasize that the inclusion of similar sets of dummies
(see sections 5.2 and 5.3 below) would make the estimates of all inverse elasticities in this model statistically
insigniﬁcant.
Finally, in most speciﬁcations we ﬁnd no appreciable diﬀerence in the estimates using men or women or
both groups pooled. If anything the speciﬁcation using men only, which is usually preferred in this literature,
produces larger estimates of the inverse elasticity 1
σIMMI in the basic speciﬁcation of column (2). Rows 4 and 5
of Table 2 (as well as Table A4 in the Appendix that separates all the results between men and women) present
robustness checks. Using the 2SLS method (with relative employment instrumenting relative hours worked)
and omitting observations for 1960 does not change signiﬁcantly any result. In the last the two rows of Table 2,
we inquire whether the small but signiﬁcant degree of imperfect substitution, estimated using all groups is also
17We also run our regressions using their exact method and codes obtaining results essentially identical to those reported.
22present restricting our sample to less educated or to young workers. Since the inﬂow of young, less educated
immigrants is credited with the large competition eﬀects on less educated natives it is relevant to check that
even for those speciﬁc groups some degree of imperfect substitutability exists. While the estimates become
somewhat more imprecise and in some instances a bit smaller, by and large they are still signiﬁcant and usually
around -0.05, even when we include all dummies. We take this as evidence that young and less educated native
workers exhibit a signiﬁcant, if small, degree of imperfect substitution with immigrants.
Table 3 does not need lengthy comment, as it reproduces Table 2 exactly except that in the sample in
which we construct wages we eliminate (besides self-employed and workers reporting no wage) workers still
attending school. We perform this check since Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) argues that the estimates of
− 1
σIMMI in Ottaviano and Peri (2006a) were signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the inclusion of individuals still attending
school. While reproducing (essentially exactly) Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) results in the “fully-dummy-
saturated” regressions of column (5), Table 3 shows that the inclusion or exclusion of people attending school
does not make any diﬀerence in the estimates of the basic speciﬁcation and of all other speciﬁcations. We
interpret the large imprecision of the estimates in column (5) and the stability of estimates in other columns as
another sign that the relevant identifying variation in the data demonstrates imperfect substitutability which
is in large part absorbed by the inclusion of the dummies. Notice that a formal test performed using even the
coeﬃcients and standard errors in column (5) of Table 2 or 3 only rejects once out of 14 times the hypothesis
of − 1
σIMMI = −0.05 at a 5% signiﬁcance level. Hence, even the Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) estimates
cannot reject such a degree of imperfect substitution (i.e., an elasticity of 20). It is only that their standard
errors are too large, and the identifying variation too small, to produce signiﬁcant point estimates18.
5.2 Estimates of σEXP
We can now use equation (14) to infer the systematic, time-invariant, components of the eﬃciency terms θDkj
and θFkj. In particular, those terms can be obtained using the estimates of the ﬁxed eﬀects b Ikj,f r o me q u a t i o n




1+e x p (b Ikj)
,b θDkjt =
1
1+e x p (b Ikj)
(15)
Using the values of b θDkj and b θFkjt from above and the estimate b σIMMI we can construct the aggregate la-












. Aggregating the marginal
pricing conditions for each education-experience group (given by relations (10) and (11)) implies the following
18We also performed the regression speciﬁed in Table 2 using a wage sample that includes only full-year full-time workers. The
estimates are almost identical to those presented in Table 2 and are available upon request..



































where Wkjt = wFbkjt(Fkjt/Nkjt)+wDbkjt(Dkjt/Nkjt) is the average wage paid to workers in the education-
experience group k, j and can be considered as the compensation to one unit of the composite input Nkjt.19
Equation (16) provides the basis for estimating the parameter 1
σEXP , which measures the elasticity of rela-
tive demand for workers with identical education and diﬀerent experience levels. Empirical implementation is
achieved by rewriting it as:
ln(Wkjt)=It + Ikt + Ikj −
1
σEXP
ln( b Nkjt)+ekjt (17)











σHL ln(Nt), the year by education ﬁxed













education by experience ﬁxed eﬀects Ikj capture the terms lnθkj that we assumed in section 3.1 constant over
time. The term ekjt represents a education-experience speciﬁc random disturbance. Notice that speciﬁcation
(17) requires the inclusion of the terms It and Ikt to absorb eﬀects predicted by the model due to changes in
the broader labor aggregates and their productivity. On the other hand, the term Ikj controls for education-
experience speciﬁc productivity terms that are assumed constant over time. Such an identifying assumption
follows closely Borjas (2003) (see section VII.A of the paper) and Borjas and Katz (2007) (see section 1.4 of the
paper) and is exactly akin to the assumption made in the basic speciﬁcation (14) above. Notice for instance
that we (and the previous literature) do not include experience by time eﬀects Ijt in estimating 1
σEXP .A sw e
see in Table 4 below, the saturation of the model with that extra set of dummies would reduce the estimates of
− 1
σEXP to a value insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.
Each cell of Table 4 reports the estimate of − 1
σEXP from a separate regression. In column (1) we implement
regression (17) using the labor index ln( b Nkjt) constructed exactly as described above. We alternatively use a
sample of men only (ﬁrst row), women only (second row) or men and women pooled (third row). In the fourth
row we use employment, rather than hours worked to construct ln( b Nkjt), a n di nt h el a s tr o ww eo m i ty e a r
1960. As the elasticity of substitution σIMMI is quite large, the construction of b Nkjt is not very dissimilar from
simply adding hours worked by native and immigrants within the cell. Column (2) shows the results when we
construct ln( b Nkjt) using the more intuitive sum of hours worked within the cell. The method of estimation in
19The wage Wkjt is an average of the wages paid to U.S.- and foreign-born workers in group k,j. The averaging weights are
equal to the share of hours worked by each sub-group in the group k,j.
24Table 4 is 2SLS using ln(Fkjt), the hours worked by immigrants in the cell, as instrument for ln( b Nkjt). Once
we control for the dummies immigration is considered as a pure supply shock and is used to instrument the
variation of ln( b Nkjt). Column (3) departs from the basic speciﬁcation by adding a set of time by experience
ﬁxed eﬀects in the estimation. Its purpose is to illustrate the eﬀect of absorbing with dummies a large part of
the variation when estimating − 1
σEXP . The reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered
by education-experience group.
B e f o r ec o m m e n t i n go nt h er e s u l t sr e p o r t e di nT a b l e4l e tus remind the reader that estimates of the elasticity
− 1
σEXP exist in the literature. They use the variation in relative cohort size to estimate the eﬀect on relative
cohort wages. The most inﬂuential are the following three. First Welch, using ﬁve-year experience groups within
four education groups (in a set-up similar to this paper) estimated a value of − 1
σEXP between -0.080 and -0.218
(see Table 7 and 8 of Welch, 1979) corresponding to an elasticity between 4.6 and 12. Then Katz and Murphy
using only two experience groups (young, equivalent to 1-5 years of experience and old, equivalent to 26 to 35
years of experience) ﬁnd − 1
σEXP = −0.342 (footnote 23 in Katz and Murphy, 1992) equivalent to an elasticity of
3. Finally, in the most inﬂuential contribution Card and Lemieux (2001) using the supply variation due to the
baby boomers’ cohorts estimate a value of − 1
σEXP between -0.107 and -0.237 (Table V in Card and Lemieux,
2001) implying an elasticity between 4.2 and 9.3.
It is therefore reassuring to notice that the estimates of Column (1) and (2) of Table 4 relative to men
and to the pooled sample are exactly in the range estimated by Welch (1979) as well as, for the large part,
in the range estimated by Card and Lemieux (2001). The estimated − 1
σEXP ranges between -0.07 and -0.16.
Only for the sample of women (second row) are the estimates imprecise and not signiﬁcant — possibly due to
larger heterogeneity of this sample because of the lower labor market attachment of women (most of the results
of Welch, 1979, and Card and Lemieux, 2001, are based on men only). Notice also the extreme similarity of
the results obtained by constructing ln( b Nkjt) in the more cumbersome model-based way (column 1) or simply
adding hours worked in the cell (column 2). This is often the case when the sub-groups of workers exhibit high
elasticity of substitution. All in all, our preferred estimated value of σEXP (using the men or pooled sample
for the whole period) is between 6.2 and 7.7. and it is perfectly compatible with the estimates in Welch (1979)
and Card and Lemieux (2001).
Finally, column (3) saturates the education-experience, experience-time and education-time variation with
dummies and generates insigniﬁcant estimates of − 1
σEXP .T h i si st h es a m ee ﬀect produced by dummy saturation
in the estimates of − 1
σIMMI (in Column 5 of Tables 2 and 3) and shows the sensitivity of these elasticity estimates
to the inclusion of an excessive number of dummies. In the light of the practice in the previous literature
(including Borjas, 2003 and Borjas and Katz, 2007), of the existing estimates of − 1
σEXP and consistently with the
previous section, we consider therefore speciﬁcations (1) and (2) as providing the relevant parameter estimates.
25Essentially the estimates of σEXP in the literature range between 5 and 10 and our preferred estimates indicate
a value between 6 and 8.
5.3 Estimates of σHL, σLL and σHH
5.3.1 Using the Model
Aggregating one level further, we can construct the CES composite b Nkt. We obtain the estimates b θkj from the
experience by education ﬁxed eﬀects in regression (17), as follows: b θkj =e x p ( b Ikj)/
X
j
exp(b Ikj). Then we use














production function chosen, together with marginal cost pricing, implies that the compensation going to the

































Wkjt is the average wage in education group k20 in broad group b.T h e p r o b l e m o f
using the general formula (18) as basis for the empirical estimates of 1
σbb is that we only have 6 observations
(years) in each broad education group (H and L) and we need to allow at least an education-speciﬁct i m et r e n d
to capture the term lnθkt. This would not give enough degrees of freedom to estimate a parameter for each group
allowing σHH,σ LL and σHL to be diﬀerent. Therefore, using the National Census Data the only possibility is


















Equation (19) allows the estimation of 1
σEDU using 24 observations (four education groups over six years) if











σEDU ln(Nt) can be absorbed by a common time eﬀect (or a common
time-trend) and the education-speciﬁc productivity lnθkt c a nb es u m m a r i z e di na ne d u c a t i o n - s p e c i ﬁct i m et r e n d
(plus possibly an education-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect). By doing so we can estimate the following speciﬁcation:
ln(Wkt)=It +( TimeTrend)k −
1
σEDU
ln( b Nkt)+ekt (20)
Conditional on these controls, the identifying assumption is that any other change in employment of foreign-
20The weight for the wage of each group equals the size of the composite input for that education-experience cell, Lkjt,r e l a t i v e
to the size of the composite input for the whole education group Lkt.T h i si sm e a s u r e db yt h es h a r eo fg r o u pk,j in total working
hours of educational group k.
26born within a group is a supply shift. The above one is the assumption made in Borjas (2003), Ottaviano and
Peri (2006a) and Borjas and Katz (2007). It is impossible, due to the very few periods of observation in the
Census data to test empirically the validity of the restriction σHH = σLL = σHL = σEDU. Moreover such
restriction is neither common to the rest of the labor literature (that, as we illustrated above, mostly assumes
σHH = σLL = ∞ and σHL < ∞) nor innocuous in determining the eﬀects of immigration on wages (as we will
show in section 6). It is very important, therefore, that we complement the current estimates with further data
to produce independent estimates of σLL and σHL,t h a tw ed oi nt h en e x ts e c t i o nu s i n gC P Sy e a r l yd a t a .
Table 5 shows the estimates of − 1
σEDU assuming the restriction σHH = σLL = σHL = σEDU and imple-
menting regression (20). If the elasticities 1
σHL, 1
σLL and 1
σHH are not equal, such procedure would at best give
an estimate of their average value. In this section we mostly care to show that even such average value is rather
sensitive to the inclusion of few ﬁxed eﬀects, and in most cases our estimates of σEDU are a bit larger than
(but comparable to) the one estimated and used in Borjas (2003) and Borjas and Katz (2007). The key point,
however, made in the next section is that when we allow σLL and σHH to be diﬀerent from σHL the data
strongly suggest that those within-broad group elasticities are much larger than between-broad group elasticity
and that σLL is close to ∞.
The diﬀerence between speciﬁcation (1) and (2) in Table 5 is the construction of the aggregate labor input
ln( b Nkt). In speciﬁcation (1) we follow the model-based procedure described above and use the estimated elas-
ticities σIMMI and σEXP to construct ln( b Nkt). In speciﬁcation (2) we simply add hours worked across native
and foreign workers and between diﬀerent experience groups as if they were perfect substitutes. The estimated
equation in column (1) and (2) is exactly as in expression (20) and the time eﬀects It are assumed to be a
common time trend while (TimeTrend)k are education-speciﬁc time trends. The method of estimation is 2SLS
using ln(Fkt) the (logarithm of) hours supplied by foreign-born workers in education group k as instrument for
ln( b Nkt). Speciﬁcation (3) diﬀe r sa si ta l l o w st h ec o m m o nt i m ee ﬀects It to be captured by dummies rather
than by a trend while speciﬁcation (4) adds to the time trends four education-speciﬁc dummies. Speciﬁcation
(1) and (2) reproduce the method adopted in Borjas (2003), Borjas and Katz (2007) and Ottaviano and Peri
(2006a), speciﬁcation (3) seems more consistent with the theoretical model as we have no reason to believe that











σEDU ln(Nt) follows a trend in time, while speciﬁcation (4) is a bit more
demanding, as it assumes education-speciﬁc intercepts as well as time-trends to capture the terms lnθkt.
We estimate the elasticity − 1
σEDU on men only (ﬁrst row), women only (second row), men and women pooled
(third row) and, as in the previous tables, using employment rather than hours as alternative measure of labor
input (fourth row) and omitting 1960 (ﬁfth row). Most of the speciﬁcations in column (1) and (2) using the
whole 1960-2006 sample produce estimates around −0.4, that imply σEDU =2 .5. A l l o w i n gaf r e et i m ee ﬀect
(column 3) or restricting the sample to post 1970, both cause a signiﬁcant decline in the estimated value of
271
σEDU that drops to 0.2-0 .3 implying an elasticity σEDU between 3.3a n d5 . Finally, including education eﬀects
(column 4) increases the estimates of 1
σEDU up to −0.7 but also dramatically increase their standard error so
that the value is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.
One needs to be careful when comparing these estimates to the previous literature. The only clear comparison
is with Borjas (2003) that estimates − 1
σEDU = −0.759 (standard error equal to 0.582) and Borjas and Katz
(2007) who estimate − 1
σEDU = −0.412 (with standard error equal to 0.312) as they use exactly the same model.
The ﬁrst point estimate is consistent with those in column (4) of Table 5, while the second is close to those
in column (1) and (2). Our standard errors are smaller than those in the two previous studies, and the point
estimates are similar to them. Hence our estimates of − 1
σEDU are as good as those produced by previous studies
on the national impact of immigrants. Comparing these values, however, to the estimates of 1
σHL from the
previous literature (such as Katz and Murphy, 1992; Angrist, 1995; Johnson, 1997; and Krusell et al, 2000) is
very misleading. Those studies expressly estimate the elasticity between two groups (not four) with high and
low education. They separate the groups at schooling level equal to high school graduation or some college
education and expressly consider as perfect substitutes workers within each of the two groups. Hence, relative
to that literature, the present method estimates an elasticity that averages the inverse 1
σHL (estimated mostly
between 0.5 and 0.7) and 1
σHH and 1
σLL assumed equal to 0 in those studies. Interpreting 1
σEDU as such an
average, values ranging between 0.24 and 0.44 as in our preferred speciﬁcations of Columns (1) and (2) of Table
5 are perfectly consistent with that literature. Our estimates of 1
σEDU provide no information, however, on the
individual values of 1
σHL, 1
σHH and 1
σLL, nor do they test whether the equality restriction is upheld by the data.
As there is no indication in the literature that those elasticities are equal, and as the actual value of 1
σLL is
particularly relevant to calculate the wage eﬀect of immigrants in the next section, we use the CPS yearly data
to estimate independently 1
σHL, 1
σHH and 1
σLL and test the restriction that they are equal.
5.3.2 Using the CPS and the Katz and Murphy Method
We implement the method used by Katz and Murphy (1992) (KM from now on) and described in section VI.A
of their paper. The estimate of 1
σHL that they obtain is the most widely cited and used in this whole literature
and therefore we think it is appropriate to take their data and method as natural reference and extend them to
estimate 1
σHH and 1
σLL. We use the yearly IPUMS-CPS data from King et al (2008) and we use a deﬁnition of
the sample, of the education groups and of weekly wages, hours worked and other variables identical to those
used for the Census data in the previous section.21 The details for the construction of the sample and variables
using the CPS data are in Appendix C. Essentially we consider workers 18 years or older not living in group
quarters, who worked at least a week last year with experience between 1 and 40 years to construct the sample
21The IPUMS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples) produces comparable variable deﬁnitions and names between the
CENSUS data (that we used in the previous sections) and CPS data (that we use in this section).
28of hours worked (that measures labor inputs). And we use the same sample omitting self-employed and workers
who did not receive wage compensation to construct the average weekly wages, weighting each individual by
her hours worked. The data cover the period 1963-2006, so we have 44 yearly observations to estimate each
elasticity. We ﬁrst reproduce the exact KM method extending their analysis to the period 1963-2006 (their





The wHt is the average weekly wage of workers with college degree (calculated as hours-weighted average)
and wLt is the hours-weighted average weekly wage of high school graduates. The KM method considers group
H as made of college-equivalent labor units and L as constituted by high-school equivalent units. Hence the
supply NHt is constructed including hours worked by college educated plus hours worked by those with some
college weighted by 0.69 (the conversion factor between some college and college estimated by KM) while NLt
includes hours worked by high school graduates plus those worker by people with no degree weighted by 0.93
and hours worked by people with some college weighted by 0.29.22 Interpreting the term It as capturing the
systematic component of the relative productivity ln(θHt/θLt), and ut as capturing its random component,
equation (21) can be easily derived by taking the relative marginal productivity of NHt and NLt in our model.
The only diﬀerence is that the nesting of our model implies that workers with some college should contribute
their hours of work only to the construction of NHt (rather then being split between the two groups) as they
are all included in group H. Finally following KM we consider the evolution of It over time as a time trend.
The ﬁrst column of Table 6 shows the estimates of − 1
σHL implementing equation (21). We use the sample
of men and women pooled in Table 6 (as done by KM) while we report in Table A5 in the Appendix the
corresponding estimates using wages calculated on the male sample only. The diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and
the second row is in the split of hours worked by those with some college education. In the ﬁrst row we split
them between the two groups (as described above and exactly reproducing KM) and in the second we include
them in the group H only, more consistently with out model. The third row uses employment rather than hours
worked as measure of labor supply and the last row omits the Sixties. We report in brackets the OLS standard
errors and in square brackets the Newey-West autocorrelation-robust standard errors (as the time-series data
may contain some autocorrelation).
The estimates of − 1
σHL obtained with the KM method extended to the 1963-2006 (or 1970-2006) period are
between -0.52 and -0.66, with standard errors between 0.06 and 0.09 hence very signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.
They are close to the original estimates -0.709 with standard error of 0.15 and conﬁrm the imperfect substitution
22For the justiﬁcation of thse weights see Katz and Murphy (1992) page 68. The results are essentially identical weighting workers
with no degree by 1 in the group L and splitting workers with some college 50-50 between the H and the L group.
29between workers in the H a n di nt h eL group with an elasticity ranging between 1.5 and 1.8. The estimate
obtained including workers with some college in H only (second row) is somewhat smaller -0.32, and compatible
with an elasticity between 2 and 3. All in all those estimates conﬁrm that an elasticity around 2, which has
been frequently used in the literature, seems a reasonable estimate of σHL.
The KM method and our nested structure, moreover, allow us to estimate on the time series data also the
elasticities 1
σHH and 1










Equation (22) is used to estimate 1
σLL by regressing the relative weekly wages of high school graduates relative
to workers with no degree on their relative hours worked, assuming that ILt (that captures ln(θHSGt/θSHSt))
follows a time-trend, while (23) is used to estimate 1
σHH by regressing the relative weekly wages of college
graduates relative to those with some college on their relative hours worked, also assuming that IHt (that
captures ln(θCOGt/θSCOt)) follows a time trend. Column 2 and 3 of Table 6 report the estimates of − 1
σLL and
− 1
σHH respectively. Column 2 and 3 of Table A5 report the same estimates for the sample of men only. The most
important result emerging very consistently from those estimates is that both of them, and particularly − 1
σLL,
are much smaller in absolute value than − 1
σHL. In the majority of cases − 1
σLL and − 1
σHH are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 0. The estimates of − 1
σLL are at most equal to -0.039 and a one-sided test can exclude at any
conﬁdence level that the estimate is larger than 0.10 in absolute value. The F-test statistic of the hypothesis
− 1
σLL =-0.32 (the lowest estimate of − 1
σHL) is 258, rejecting the null of equality at an overwhelming level of
conﬁdence. The estimate of − 1
σHH is around -0.10, and also a one-sided test always reject the hypothesis that
it is equal to -0.32.




σLL is overwhelmingly rejected by the data. Second the estimated value of 1
σLL is between
0.039 and 0, implying an elasticity of substitution between workers with high school degree and those with no
high school of 25 or above. The value of 1
σHH is estimated around 0.10, also much smaller than 1
σHL, often not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0, implying an elasticity of 10 or larger.
The method used above to estimate those crucial elasticities does not hinge on variation of supply generated
by immigration. The CPS data do not allow us to measure hours variation due to immigrants as they begin
recording immigration status in 1994 leaving 12 observations only. However, the CPS begins recording “Hispanic
30Origin” status from 1970. Hence assuming that changes in Hispanic workers among less educated are mainly
due to immigration we can re-estimate (22) on post 1970 data (37 observations) instrumenting NHSGt/NSHSt
with the equivalent measure of relative hours worked by Hispanics only. The point estimate of − 1
σLL (not in the
Table) using this method is -0.019 and the standard error is 0.035. Again no evidence of imperfect substitution
is found.
All in all, the last two sections produce very robust evidence that is consistent with the previous labor




imposing the equality restriction used ﬁrst by Borjas (2003) and then by Ottaviano and Peri (2006a) and Borjas
and Katz (2007) generates estimates of 1
σEDU around 0.40, that value can at most be interpreted as an average
of those elasticities. However, using CPS data we ﬁnd that the equality restriction its overwhelmingly rejected
by the data. The same data suggest that reasonable estimates for individual elasticities are in the range between
0.5a n d0 .66 for 1
σHL and between 0 and 0.10 for 1
σHH and 1
σLL with the ﬁrst coeﬃcient closer to 0.10 and the
second closer to 0. The estimated value of 1
σEDU around 0.40 is indeed between those estimates, compatible
with the idea that it somehow estimates an average between them.
6 Immigration and Wages: 1990-2006
We are now ready for the third and ﬁn a ls t e pi nc a l c u l a t i n gt h ee ﬀects of immigration on the wages of U.S.- and
foreign-born workers. The ﬁrst step of the procedure (Section 3) required specifying a production function and
deriving labor demand curves and the elasticity of wages with respect to immigration of workers with diﬀerent
skills. The second step (Section 5) required estimation of the relevant parameters (elasticities of substitution).
The third step (this section) uses these estimates and the actual ﬂow of immigrants by group during the 1990-
2006 period (reported in column 3 of Table 1) in the expressions reported in Appendix A to calculate the eﬀects
of immigrants on the wages of U.S.- and foreign-born workers in individual groups as well as overall.
6.1 The Fallacy of Partial Eﬀects
Most existing empirical studies on the eﬀect of immigration on wages (including Borjas, Freeman and Katz,
1997; Card, 2001; Friedberg, 2001; Section IV—but not Section VII—of Borjas, 2003; and Borjas, 2006) carefully
estimate the partial elasticity of native wages to immigration within the same skill group (often taken as an
education-experience group) and treat this elasticity as “the eﬀect of immigration on wages”.23 As we illustrated
in Section 3.3, the partial eﬀect, described in equation (12), is uninformative of the actual overall eﬀect of
immigration on wages. To evaluate that we need to consider the entire distribution of immigrants across skill
23Even the recent meta-study by Longhi, Nijcamp and Poot (2005) considers this partial eﬀect as the relevant estimate across
studies.
31groups, the cross eﬀects among groups and the adjustment of capital. More importantly, the partial elasticity
(12) is likely to be negative in most reasonable models as long as immigrants are closer substitutes for natives
in the same group (education-experience) than they are to natives in other skill groups.






is calculated to be negative
and around −0.10 (since the preferred estimate of 1
σIMMI is around 0.05 and the preferred estimates of 1
σEXP are
around 0.15). This is a partial elasticity and can be interpreted, using formula (12) as meaning that an increase
by 10% in the hours supplied in group k,j, given constant supply in the other groups (i.e., keeping ﬁxed the
aggregates Nkt and Nt ) would produce a negative 1% variation in the real wage of native workers in the group.
If one fails to notice the partial nature of the elasticity above, one could be tempted to generalize these ﬁndings,
interpreting them as saying that the inﬂow of immigrants over the period 1990-2006, which increased total hours
worked by 11.4%, caused a negative 1.1% change (over 1990-2006) in the average wages of natives (0.10∗11.4%),
or that groups such as high school dropouts, for which the inﬂow of immigrants was as high as 23% of initial
hours worked, lost as much as 2.3% of their wage. Such a simplistic generalization is misleading, however, as
expression (12) only accounts for the eﬀect on wages of immigrants in the same skill group and omits all the
cross-group eﬀects from immigrants in other skill groups, many of which are positive eﬀects. In fact (as we see






, the wage eﬀects on
natives across groups were very diﬀerent: some were positive and others negative, depending on the relative
size of the skill groups, the relative strength of cross-group eﬀects and the actual pattern of immigration across
groups. The simplistic values of -1.1% or -2.3% mentioned above do not bear any resemblance to the actual
wage eﬀects calculated below, which diﬀer across education groups and depend on the elasticity and supply
in each group. Limiting our attention to the elasticity ε
partial
kjt , or emphasizing this eﬀect too much, would be
misleading in evaluating the eﬀect of immigration on wages.
6.2 Long Run Eﬀects of Immigration on Wages
The results in Table 7 are some of the most important in the paper. These simulation results describe the impact
of immigration over the 1990-2006 period on the wages of U.S.- and foreign-born workers in the long run. We
focus on the 1990-2006 period as it is the most recent covered by available Census and ACS data and it is the
period of greatest immigration in recent U.S. history. To obtain the simulated eﬀects we proceed in four steps.
First, using expressions (25) and (26) in Appendix A, the relevant parameter values σIMMI,σ EXP,σHL,σHH
and σLL as well as the percentage change in foreign-born workers by skill group, ∆Fkj,1990−2006/F kj,1990 (shown
in Table 1) we calculate the percentage change in real wages for U.S.-born and foreign-born workers in each
skill group (k,j). The value of the elasticities used in each simulation are reported in the ﬁrst ﬁve rows of Table
7. Second, we obtain the average wage change in each education group for foreign- and U.S.-born workers by
32weighting the percentage change of each experience sub-group by its wage share in the education group. This
provides the entries in the rows labelled “less than HS” , “HS graduates”, “Some CO” and “CO graduates” in
Table 7. Third, we average the changes across education groups for U.S.- and foreign-born separately, again
weighting them by their wage shares as described in formulas (27) and (28) in Appendix A. Those values are
reported in the rows labelled “Average US-born” and “Average Foreign-Born”. Finally, we average the changes
for the two groups (U.S.- and foreign-born workers), still using wage-share weights (as described in formula (29)
in Appendix A), to obtain the overall wage change reported in the last row labelled “Overall Average”. The
upper part of Table 7 can be compared to the results obtained in the previous literature (Borjas, 2003 and
Borjas and Katz, 2007) that mostly focuses on the eﬀect of immigration on the wages of U.S.-born workers. The
lower part of Table 7 reports the eﬀects of immigration on the wages of foreign-born, less frequently considered
in the previous literature. The table reports the “long run” eﬀects, namely the wage eﬀects once capital has
fully adjusted, (∆κt/κt)immigration =0 .24
In order to evaluate how our simulation ﬁts with the previous labor literature the ﬁrst three columns present
the simulated wage eﬀect of immigrants using the most common elasticity estimates from the literature. As
argued above, it is common in the labor and macro literature to adopt a value of σHL b e t w e e n1 . 5a n d2
(following Katz and Murphy, 1992; Johnson, 1997; Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998; Krusell et al., 2000 and
others). It is also common to consider workers with some college and a college education (within H)a sp e r f e c t
substitutes as well as for workers with no degree and with a high school degree within L, hence σLL = σHH = ∞.
From Card and Lemieux (2001) and Welch (1979) we borrow a value of σEXP between 3.3 and 10. Finally we
assume perfect substitution between immigrants and natives in a cell, σIMMI = ∞. C o l u m n1u s e sv a l u e so f
elasticity in the low end of the range from the literature, column 2 uses values in the high end and column 3
chooses a typical median value. The wage eﬀects of column (3) would therefore be what the“median economist”
would predict without re-estimating the elasticity of demand using the immigration shocks. As we see, the
simulated eﬀects imply a very modest negative wage eﬀect for native workers with no degree (−0.5%) as well
as for those with a high school degree (−0.3%), and a modest positive wage eﬀect for workers with some college
or more (+0.1%).
Before looking at the intermediate columns which use our own estimates, let us compare those eﬀects with
those estimated in Borjas and Katz (2007), shown in the last column in Table 7. It is evident that the restriction
σHL = σLL = σHH =2 .4 (rejected by the data) is responsible for generating the large negative impact (-4.7%)
on the group of natives with no degree, estimated in that article. That restriction is also responsible for
generating the signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on college graduates (-1.6%). Plainly stated, while immigration over
1990-2006 was rather unbalanced, especially between workers with no high school degree (+23.6% labor supply
24Notice that, by assumption of constant return to scale (in K and N) in the production function, and because we assume no
eﬀect of immigration on technology, the overall average wage eﬀects in the long-run has to be 0.
33due to immigrants) and high school graduates (+10% due to immigrants), it was rather balanced between
workers with high school or less (+13% of labor supply) and those with some college or more (+10%). The
elasticity value σLL plays a fundamental role in determining the relative wage eﬀects, and a value as low as
2.4 (used by Borjas and Katz, 2007) produces dramatic eﬀects relative to our estimated value of 20 (see below)
or to the routinely assumed value of ∞ (closer to 20, and in fact producing an almost identical eﬀect to that
obtained using an estimate of 20) used in columns 1-3. Those large negative eﬀects, therefore, contrast with
what one would predict using parameters previously estimated.
What do the parameter estimates of σIMMI, the only parameter speciﬁc to the immigration literature, add
to a model that otherwise uses standard estimates from the labor literature? Columns 4 to 6 illustrate such an
eﬀect. While the degree of imperfect substitution between natives and immigrants is small (σIMMI is between
15 and 30, and most likely around 20), it is enough to generate non-trivial diﬀerences, particularly on the wage
of the group with no degree and on the wage of foreign-born workers. For instance, column 6 uses the typical
estimate of σIMMI = 20 and shows, relative to column 3 (with identical parameters and σIMMI = ∞)t h a t
less educated natives now experience a small, real wage gain (+0.7%) rather than a small loss (-0.5%) and,
similarly, college graduates increase their gain to 0.9% (up from 0.1%). These diﬀerences of 0.8-1.0%, while
not as large as those between columns 3 and 10, contribute to producing an even less pessimistic assessment
of the eﬀect of immigration on native wages. The small real wage gains of natives in column 6 relative to 3
happen, obviously, at the expense of previous immigrants who bear most of the direct competition eﬀect of
new immigrants (as our model assumes that they are perfect substitutes with them) and lose, in our median
estimates of column 6, between 4.5 and 7.5% of their wage. This is the relevant distributional shift due to
immigrants: all native workers gain (a little) from immigrants and all previous immigrants lose (a non-trivial
amount) from new immigration. On average, natives gain 0.6% of their wages from immigration because the
imperfect substitutability of immigrants allows them to appropriate a larger part of the immigration surplus,
at the expense of previous immigrants who lose 6.4% of their real wages.
Finally, columns 7 to 9 repeat the simulations using the range of parameters estimated in this paper. The
main departure from the results of columns 4 to 6 is that the elasticities σHL,σ LL and σHH are now estimated
using the CPS data. However, since σLL and σHH are quite large (between 10 and 50) and our estimates of
σHL are close to those in the literature (between 1.4 and 2), the simulations in columns 7-9 are remarkably
close to those in 4-6. They are also not very diﬀerent from those in 1-3 but are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those
of Borjas and Katz (2007) in column 10. In our typical estimate (column 9) natives with no degree actually
experience a very small gain (+0.3%) since their mild imperfect substitutability with immigrants compensates
for the small negative eﬀect (-0.5%) caused by the relative abundance of immigrants in the group L. Still, in
relative terms workers with some college or a college degree gain the most in our preferred simulation (+1.0%
34and +0.5%, respectively). What is remarkable, however, is that even with the smallest value of σLL,w h i c hi s
compatible with our estimates (in Section 5.3.2) the group of less educated natives loses at most 0.3% of its real
w a g ea st h er e s u l to f1 6y e a r sw o r t ho fi m m i g r a n ti n ﬂows, and the other groups gain, in the long run, between
0.4% and 1%.
In summary, while very diﬀerent from those presented in Borjas and Katz (2007), our estimated eﬀects
for native workers are extremely similar to those produced by simply applying the most common elasticity
estimates available in the labor literature to the immigration-driven labor supply shock. The only diﬀerence
is due to the fact that our explicit estimate of a small degree of imperfect substitution between natives and
immigrants produces a small, positive wage eﬀect on all natives and a signiﬁcant, negative wage eﬀect on
previous immigrants.
6.3 Short Run Eﬀects with Yearly Capital Adjustment
How long does it take for physical capital to adjust and restore its long run returns? And in the presence of
sluggish adjustment of capital what are the eﬀects of immigration on wages in the short run? As discussed







, to the change in the wage of each group. Hence, the short run wage response for
each group and for the averages will diﬀer from the long run response by a common constant, due to the chosen
Cobb-Douglas structure in which κt only aﬀects marginal productivity of workers through the overall average
wage. A popular way to analyze the deviation of ln(κt) from its balanced growth path trend, used in the growth
and business cycle literature, is to represent its time-dynamics in the following way:











and the term β1 ln(κt−1) captures the sluggishness of yearly adjustment to shocks. The parameter (1 − β1)i s
commonly called the “speed of adjustment ” since it is the share of the deviation from the balanced growth
path (trend) eliminated each year. Finally, ∆Ft
Lt are the yearly immigration shocks and εt are other shocks.
Assuming that immigration shocks cause a proportional decrease in κt in each year, in order to calculate the
eﬀect of immigration on κt over, say, the 1990-2006 period, one needs an estimate of the parameter β1. Once we
know β1 and the sequence of yearly immigration ﬂows, ∆Ft
Lt , one can use (24) to obtain an impulse response of
ln(κt) and its deviation from trend as of 2007 (short run), as well as for later years (medium and long run). The
previous migration literature has essentially assumed β1 = 0 in the short run calculations, aggregating the ∆Ft
Lt
over one or two decades assuming ﬁxed capital stock (implying a very large deviation from the trend!). On the
other hand, it has assumed β1 = 1, (full adjustment) in the long run calculations. The recent empirical growth
35literature (Islam, 1995; Caselli et al., 1996) and the recent business cycle literature (Romer, 2006, Chapter 4), in
contrast, provide model-based and empirical estimates of β1. The recent growth literature usually estimates a
10% speed of convergence of capital to the own balanced growth path for advanced (OECD) economies (Islam,
1995; Caselli et al., 1996), implying β1 =0 .9. Similarly, the business cycle literature calculates the speed of
convergence of capital to be between 10% and 20% in each year (Romer, 2006, Chapter 4) for closed economies,
and even faster rates for open economies. Hence β1 =0 .9 seems a reasonable estimate (if anything on the
conservative side). We also estimated a simple AR(1) process with trend for ln(κt). We constructed the variable
κt =( Kt/Lt), dividing the stock of U.S. capital at constant prices (Net Stock of Private and Government Fixed
Assets from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008) by the total non-farm employment from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (2008) for each year during the period 1960-2006. We estimated several speciﬁcations including










as a shock and instrumented those
with changes in the population (to correct for endogeneity of employment).25
All estimates of β1 ranged between 0.8a n d0 .9 (a speed of adjustment of 10 to 20% a year) with standard
errors ranging between 0.02 and 0.08. We could never reject β1 =0 .9, and we could always reject β1 =1( n o
adjustment). Hence we consider 10% a reliable estimate of the yearly speed of capital adjustment. Using the
series of immigration rates over 1990-2006 and the estimated parameters of capital adjustment β1 =0 .9,γ =
−0.9 (assuming that capital adjustment begins the same year as immigrants are received), the recursive equation
(24) allows us to calculate (∆κ1990−2006/κ1990)immigration as of year 2007 and the share of the deviation from
trend that remains ﬁve years (medium run) later in 2012. Using formula (9) we can calculate the eﬀect of ∆κ
on the average wage and on each group’s wage. To the contrary, assuming no adjustment of capital in the
short run (β1 =1 ,γ = −1), since the cumulated inﬂow of immigrants during the 1990-2006 period amounts
to 9.6% of the total hours worked in 199026, implies an eﬀect of immigration on average real wages equal to
(0.33)∗(−9.6%) = −3.2%, as of 2007. Using the actual 10% speed of adjustment of capital each year, however,
we obtain an eﬀect on the capital-labor ratio due to immigration of just −3.5%, corresponding to a mere −1.1%
(= 0.33 ∗ 3.5%) eﬀect on real wages as of 2007, and in ﬁve more years (2012) the negative eﬀect on wages is
reduced to −0.6%.
Table 8 reports the simulated eﬀects on wages as of 2007 (column 1) and as of 2012 (column 2). The values
are calculated accounting for the yearly (short run) capital adjustment described above in response to the yearly
inﬂow of immigrants up to 2006. We use the parameter values as in column 9 of Table 7 (which represents our
preferred speciﬁcation). In the ﬁrst column of Table 8 we show the wage eﬀect as of 2007, and in the second we
25We constructed ∆Ft, for each year from 1960 to 2006, using the following procedure. From the U.S. Department of Justice,
Immigration and Naturalization Service we obtained the number of (legal) immigrants for each ﬁscal year 1960-2006. We then
distribute the net change of foreign-born workers in each decade (measured from Census data and from the American Community
Survey, which includes illegal immigrants as well as legal ones) over each year in proportion to the gross yearly ﬂows of legal
immigrants.
26This number is a bit smaller than the 11% in Table 1 because here we cumulate yearly percentage changes, using the beginning
of each year as the initial value, while in Table 1 we expresse the total 1990-2006 changes as a percentage of 1990 values.
36show the eﬀect as of 2012 assuming no immigration between 2007 and 2012. This gives us an idea of the speed
at which the economy converges to the long run eﬀects (column 3). As a comparison, column 4 shows the wage
eﬀect obtained with the traditional method of keeping capital ﬁxed (over 16 years), thus allowing a very large
decrease in the capital-labor ratio between 1990 and 2006, while column 5 shows the wage eﬀects obtained using
the traditional short run method (ﬁxed capital) and the parameter values as in column 10 of Table 7— that is,
it shows the eﬀects of immigration over 1990-2006 obtained using the Borjas and Katz (2007) method for the
short run eﬀect, corresponding also to the method used in Borjas (2003).
Three features are worthy of notice and comment. First, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the eﬀects on
native wages between our method, which accounts for the short run adjustment of capital, and the traditional
method with ﬁxed capital. Not accounting for short run capital adjustments produces a negative eﬀect on
wages of all natives around 2.1% (the diﬀerence between values in column 1 and column 4). Second, cumulating
the over-estimate of the negative eﬀect on less educated workers due to the assumption σHL,=σLL = σHH
and the negative eﬀect of the traditional short run treatment of capital, the estimates obtained following the
Borjas and Katz (2007) method, reported in column 5, show a -7.8% eﬀect on wages of workers with no degree.
This is one order of magnitude larger than our estimated short run eﬀect (-0.7%). Finally, one sees that after
only 5 years about 40% of the distance between the short run eﬀects and long run eﬀects has been eliminated,
with the average wage eﬀect on natives equal to 0% (up from -0.4% in 2007) and moving towards the long
run eﬀect of +0.6%. Given the estimated speed of capital adjustment, the inter-census changes (10 years) are
better approximated by the long run eﬀects than by the short run eﬀects. The negative short run eﬀects for
old immigrants range between -6% and -9%, because this group is the one experiencing most of the competition
from new immigrants.
All in all, our preferred estimates indicate that immigration had a small negative impact in the short run
on natives with a high school degree or less (on the order of -0.6 to -0.7%), but in the long run the eﬀect on
these groups was a small gain (+0.3 to +0.4%). In any case the eﬀects are small and explain very little of the
diﬀerence in performance of wages between workers with a college degree and those with a high school degree or
less over the 1990-2006 period. Just to give an idea of the inability of immigration to explain wage performances
in the 1990-2006 period, let us consider the wage change of workers with no degree (-2.6% in real terms) and
the wage change of those with college or more (+9.6% in real terms) that are reported in Table 1. Of the 12.2
percentage point diﬀerence in growth between the two groups (obtained by subtracting the ﬁrst value from the
second) our preferred speciﬁcation (column 9 of table 7) implies that only 0.2 percentage points (=0.5%-0.3%)
can be explained by immigration. The typical estimate from a standard labor model (column 3 of Table 7)
would imply that 0.6 percentage points are explained by immigration. In either case less than one twentieth of
the total diﬀerence can be explained by immigration. Immigration explains even less if we consider the wage
37diﬀerential between workers with high school or less and those with college or more. Over the 1990-2006 period
the ﬁrst group had a decline of 1.5% and the second an increase of 9.6%, for a diﬀerence of 11.4 percentage
points. Again, the simulations of Table 7 imply a diﬀerential in wage performance due to immigration of 0.15%
for our preferred estimate and of 0.5% for the traditional labor estimates. While we may still be worried by a
0.5% eﬀect over 16 years it does not even come close to explaining the almost 12 percentage point diﬀerential
in growth between workers with a high school degree or less and college graduates.
6 . 4 C o m p a r i s o nw i t hc r o s s - c i t ye s t i m a t e s
We have already emphasized above that the estimates and simulations presented in this paper are perfectly
in line, in method and values, with a long tradition in the labor literature that estimates the elasticity of
substitution between workers of diﬀerent skills and determines the impact of demand and supply shocks on
wages (from Katz and Murphy, 1992, to Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998, to Card and Lemieux, 2001). We
want to argue here that our results also go in the direction of reconciling the apparent puzzle in the estimates
of immigration eﬀects at the local and at the national level.
As mentioned earlier, several studies on the relative wage eﬀects of immigrants using local data (e.g., for
metropolitan areas) typically ﬁnd a small negative relative eﬀe c to fi m m i g r a n t so nw a g e se v e nw h e na c c o u n t i n g
for the internal migration response of U.S. natives (Card, 2001; Card and DiNardo, 2000; Lewis, 2005) and
correcting for the endogeneity of the immigrant’s choice of location (both factors would cause an attenuation
bias in the estimates). In light of the present model and results, those small eﬀects are not surprising at
all. Immigrants at levels of education lower than high school compete imperfectly with the large group of
natives with a high school degree or less. Moreover, their inﬂow is rather balanced, in most cities, between this
group and the group of college graduates. Most of the states that attracted many low skilled migrants such
as California, New York, Texas, and Illinois also attracted a large group of highly educated workers.27 While
immigrants are a disproportionate share of workers with no degree, if we merge them with high school graduates
their inﬂow in the last decade was not much larger than the inﬂow of immigrants among college graduates, in
most states and cities, as a percentage of their respective group. Such a pattern of supply would produce small
relative eﬀects in light of our elasticity estimates. For instance, the small elasticities estimated in Table 6.7 of
Card and Lewis (2007), implying that an increase of 10% in the relative supply of high school dropouts (due
to immigrant inﬂows) would decrease their wage by 0.3-0.5% relative to high school graduates, is perfectly in
line with the estimates of 1/σLL (=0.04) in Section 5.3.2 above. Similarly, the small relative eﬀects (between
-0.03 and -0.10) of immigration on the wage of quartile 1 relative to quartile 2 for natives estimated in Table
7 of Card (2007) is in line with the estimates of 1/σLL between 0.03 and 0.10 as long as we interpret the two
27The most notable exception is Arizona, a state that attracted mostly immigrants with a high school degree or less over the
1990-2006 period.
38quartiles as mostly containing workers with a high school education or less. Certainly the possibility that natives
use other mechanisms to protect their wages from immigration (such as mobility across states, or changes in
specialization) may still be important, and this is worth analyzing.
A second interesting phenomenon emerging from the city and state analysis (e.g., in our recent work, Ot-
taviano and Peri, 2005, 2006b, 2007 and recent work by Card, 2007) points to a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect
of immigration on the average wage of U.S. natives across U.S. states and metropolitan areas. This positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect survives 2SLS estimation, using instruments that should be exogenous to city-speciﬁc,
unobservable productivity shocks. While the imperfect substitution estimated in this paper can go part way
to explaining the positive eﬀects on average native wages, the magnitudeo fe s t i m a t e sa tt h ec i t yl e v e li sm u c h
bigger than the small positive eﬀect estimated here. In fact, our model predicts an increase in the wage of
natives of 0.5% for an increase in labor supply due to immigrants of 10%, while typical city-level estimates
imply average wage increases of 2 − 2.5%. It is possible that improved eﬃciency, gains from specialization,
and improved technological adoption have a part in explaining those local average eﬀects. While the eﬀect of
immigration on productivity is the next item in our research agenda, in this paper we have ruled out any eﬀect
of immigration on technology, eﬃciency or productivity, and in this respect we have taken a rather conservative
approach.
7 Conclusions
The present paper adopts the “national approach” to the analysis the eﬀect of immigration on wages in the
tradition of Borjas (2003), Borjas and Katz (2007) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006a). In the process it clariﬁes
four fundamental points.
First, a structural model of production that combines workers of diﬀerent skills as well as capital, and
furthermore estimates their elasticities of substitution, is necessary to assess the eﬀect of immigration on the
wages of native workers of diﬀerent skills. Estimating a reduced form or a partial elasticity cannot possibly be
informative of the total eﬀect of immigration as this derives not only from the direct competition but also from
the indirect complementarities of immigrants.
Second a crucial parameter in determining the eﬀect of immigrants is the elasticity of substitution between
workers with no degree and workers with a high school degree. This paper demonstrates that the long-established
tradition in labor economics (but overlooked by Borjas, 2003, Borjas and Katz, 2007 and Ottaviano and Peri,
2006a) of assuming that this elasticity is inﬁnite is strongly supported by the data. While the elasticity between
workers with some college education or more and those with high school education or less is much smaller (equal
to 2), the balanced inﬂow of immigrants belonging to these two groups implies very small relative wage eﬀects
of immigration, and a very small negative impact on wages of less educated immigrants.
39Third, there seems to be a small but signiﬁcant degree of imperfect substitution between natives and im-
migrants within education-experience groups. An elasticity of 20 is strongly supported by our estimates. This
cannot be ruled out even by the extremely conservative method of Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008). For
immigration to the US between 1990 and 2006, it implies an average positive long-run eﬀect on native wages
equal to +0.6% and an average negative eﬀe c to nt h ew a g e so fp r e v i o u si m m i g r a n t so fa b o u t- 6 % .
Fourth, accounting for capital adjustment, the negative eﬀect of immigration on wages is modest even in the
short run: −0.7% for workers with no high school degree as of 2007. This represents a substantial revision of the
previous short-run eﬀects calculated using the Borjas and Katz (2007) method that would be for the 1990-2006
period equal to around −7.8% or workers with no high school degree. Such a large discrepancy is mainly due
to their unwarranted assumptions of a ﬁxed capital stock and a small elasticity of substitution between workers
with no degree and those with a high school degree (around 2.4).
In sum, this paper reconciles the estimates and the ﬁndings of the national approach to the eﬀects of
immigration on wages with most of the estimates of the substitutability across workers of diﬀerent skills produced
by the labor literature in the last ﬁfteen years. It also reconciles the aggregate evidence on the wage eﬀects of
immigrants with the evidence from the “area approach” which has always found small eﬀects across US cities.
In this respect, we hope that our modeling strategy as well as our estimates and simulations can provide a
uniﬁed reference point for the current and future debate on the wage-eﬀe c t so fi m m i g r a t i o ni nt h eU S .
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44A Theoretical Appendix: Wage Reaction to Immigration
We denote the change in the supply of foreign-born due to immigration between two censuses in group k, j as
∆Fkjt = Fkjt+10 − Fkjt. We can use the demand functions (10) and (11) to derive the eﬀect of immigration on

































































































































































where sFbkjt is the share of overall wages paid in year t to foreign workers in education group b, subgroup k,
with experience j28. Analogously, sbkjt is the share of the total wage bill in year t accounted for by all workers
in education group b, subgroup k a n dw i t he x p e r i e n c ej.29
Using the percentage change in wages for each skill group, we can then aggregate and ﬁnd the eﬀect of im-
migration on several representative wages. The average wage for the whole economy in year t,i n c l u s i v eo fU . S . -







w h e r ew ei n d i c a t ew i t hκFbkjt (κDbkjt) the hours worked by immigrants (natives) of education b, subgroup
k and experience j as a share of total hours worked in the economy. Similarly, the average wage of U.S.-











































45tively. The percentage change in the average wage of native workers as a consequence of changes in each group’s






































wHbkjt represents the percentage change in the wage of U.S.-born in group b,k,j due to immigration,







































wFbkjt represents the percentage change in the wage of foreign-born in group b,k,j due to immigration,
and its expression is given in (26). Finally, by aggregating the total eﬀect of immigration on the wages of all






































Recall that the variables sFbkjt and sDbkjt represent the group’s share in total wages and notice that the
correct weighting in order to obtain the percentage change on average wages is the share in the wage bill and
not the share in employment. Due to constant returns to scale of the aggregate production function (1), while
some of the wage changes are positive and others negative, when weighted by their wage shares the summation
of these changes equals 0 once capital has adjusted fully (i.e., in the long run); hence, the change in the overall
average wage in (29) is approximately 0 in the long run. However, if U.S.- and foreign-born workers are not
perfectly substitutable, the overall eﬀect on the wage of U.S.-born workers (27) need not be 0 but will be positive
instead and the eﬀect on the average wage of foreign-born workers (28) will be negative. We also adopt the same
averaging procedure (weighting percentage changes by wage shares) in calculating the eﬀect of immigration on
speciﬁc groups of U.S.-born and foreign-born workers. For instance, the changes in average wages of college









j sDCOGjt and the change in average









j sF,SHS,jt,a n d
so on.
46B Data Appendix for the IPUMS Census Data
We downloaded the IPUMS data on June 1st, 2008. The data are relative to these samples:
1960 1% sample of the census; 1970 1% sample of the census; 1980 5% sample of the census; 1990 5% sample
of the census; 2000 5% sample of the census; 2006 1% sample of the ACS
We constructed two datasets that cover slightly diﬀerent samples. The ﬁrst aggregates the employment
and hours worked by U.S.- and foreign-born males and females in 32 education-experience groups, in each
census year. This is called the employment sample. The second is called the wage sample a n di ti su s e dt o
calculate the average weekly and hourly wages for U.S.- and foreign-born, males and females in the same 32
education-experience groups in each census year. The ﬁrst sample is slightly more inclusive than the second.
B.1 Deﬁnition of the Samples and Restrictions
B.1.1 EMPLOYMENT SAMPLE
For the EMPLOYMENT SAMPLE our deﬁnition aims at including all workers who supplied some hours of work
and who were in the 32 cells (deﬁned by education and experience) that we consider. The relevant eliminations
made in the sample were:
1) Eliminate people living in group quarters (military or convicts), which are those with the gq variable
equal to 0, 3 or 4.
2) Eliminate people younger than 18.
3) Eliminate those who worked 0 weeks last year, which corresponds to wkswork2=0 in 1960 and 1970
and wkswork1=0 in 1980-1990-2000 and ACS.
4) Once we calculate experience as age-(time ﬁrst worked), where (time ﬁrst worked) is 17 for workers
with no HS degree, 19 for HS graduates, 21 for workers with some college education and 23 for college graduates,
we eliminate all those with experience <1a n d>40.
Construction of hours worked and employment by cell
To calculate the total amount of hours worked by natives and immigrants, male and female, in each education-
experience cell, we add the hours worked by each person multiplied by her personal weight (PERWT) in the
cell.
To calculate the total employment (body-count) for natives and immigrants, male and female, in each cell
we sum the personal weight (PERWT) of each individual in the cell.
47B.1.2 WAGE SAMPLE
For the WAGE SAMPLE we identify only employee workers. Since we weight the weekly wage of each worker
for the hours of work supplied when we calculate the average weekly wage within a group, the heterogeneity in
attachment to the labor force is accounted for.
For the WAGE SAMPLE used in Tables 2, 4 and 5:
a) Apply the same elimination as for the Employment sample
b) Eliminate those workers who do not report valid salary income (999999) or report 0.
c) Eliminate the self-employed (keeping those for whom the variable CLASSWKD is between 20 and
28).
For the WAGE SAMPLE used in Table 3:
a) Apply all elimination as in the above wage sample
b) Eliminate those who are still enrolled in school (variable SCHOOL = 2) or, for year 1970, we construct
gen school=higraded - (int(higraded/10))*10
and also eliminate SCHOOL==2
Construction of the average weekly wage for each group
In each education-experience cell we average the weekly wage of individuals, each weighted by the hours
worked by the individual. Hence individuals with few hours worked (low job attachment) are correspondingly
weighted little in the calculation of the average wage of the group.
B.2 Individual Variables Deﬁnition and Description
Education:W ed e ﬁned education groups as: Some High School (SHS), High School Graduate (HSG), Some
College (SCO) and College Graduates (COG). All groups in each year are deﬁned using the variable EDUCREC
which was built in order to consistently reﬂect the variables HIGRADE and EDUC99. In particular, we deﬁne
as SHS those with EDUCREC<=6, HSG are those with EDUCREC=7, SCO are those with EDUCREC=8 and
C O Ga r et h o s ew i t hE D U C R E C = 9 .
Experience: Deﬁned as potential experience, assigns to each schooling group a certain age reﬂecting the
beginning of their working life; in particular, the initial working ages are: 17 years for SHS, 19 years for HSG,
21 years for SCO and 23 years for COG.
Immigration Status: In each year, only people who are not citizens or who were naturalized citizens are
counted as immigrants. This is done using the variable CITIZEN and by attributing the status of foreign-born
to people when the variable is equal to 2 or 3. In 1960, the variable is not available and the selection is done
using the variable BPLD (birthplace, detailed) and attributing the status of foreign-born to all of those for
which BPLD>15000, except for the codes 90011 and 90021 which indicate U.S. citizens born abroad.
48W e e k sW o r k e di naY e a r :For the censuses 1960 and 1970 the variable used to deﬁne weeks worked in
the last year is WKSWORK2, which deﬁnes weeks worked in intervals. We choose the median value for each
interval so that we impute to individuals weeks worked in the previous year according to the following criteria:
6.5 weeks if wkswork2=1; 20 weeks if wkswork2=2; 33 weeks if wkswork2=3; 43.5 weeks if wkswork2=4; 48.5
weeks if wkswork2=5; 51 weeks if wkswork2==6. For the censuses 1980, 1990, 2000 and ACS we use the variable
wkswork1 which records the exact number of weeks worked last year.
H o u r sW o r k e di naW e e k : For census years 1960 and 1970 the variable used is HRSWORK2 which
measures the hours worked during the last week, using intervals. We attribute to each interval its median value
and measure the number of hours per week worked by an individual according to the following criteria: 7.5
hours if hrswork2=1; 22 hours if hrswork2=2; 32 hours if hrswork2=3; 37 hours if hrswork2=4; 40 hours if
hrswork2=5; 44.5 hours if hrswork2=6; 54 hours if hrswork2=7; 70 hours if hrswork2==8. For the censuses
1980, 1990, 2000 and ACS we use the variable UHRSWORK which records the exact number of hours worked
in the usual week by a person.
H o u r sW o r k e di naY e a r :This is the measure of labor supply by an individual and it is obtained
multiplying Hours Worked in a Week by Weeks Worked in a Year, as deﬁned above.
Yearly Wages: The yearly wage in constant 1999 US $ is calculated as the variable INCWAGE multiplied
by the price deﬂator suggested in the IPUMS, which is the one below. Recall that each census and ACS is
relative to the previous year so the deﬂators below are those to be applied to years 1960, 1970, 1980, and so on:
Ye a r 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 2005
Deflator 5.725 4.540 2.314 1.344 1.000 0.853
Topcodes for Yearly Wages: Following an established procedure we multiply the topcodes for yearly
wages in 1960, 1970 and 1980 by 1.5.
Weekly Wages: The weekly wage for an individual is constructed by dividing the yearly wage as deﬁned
above by the number of weeks worked in a year, as deﬁned above.
C Data Appendix for the IPUMS-CPS data
We downloaded the IPUMS-CPS data on April 28th 2008 including the years 1963-2006 in the extraction.
Just as for the Census, we constructed an employment sample and a wage sample. We used the ﬁrst to
calculate measures of hours worked and employment and the second to calculate the average weekly wages for
U.S.- and foreign-born, males and females, in each skill group and in each census year. The ﬁrst sample is more
inclusive than the second. We construct hours worked, employment and average wage for each of 4 education
groups (workers with no high school, high school graduates, workers with some college and college graduates)
following as closely as possible the procedure described in Katz and Murphy (1992), page 67-68 and detailed
49below.
C.1 Deﬁnition of the Samples and Restrictions
C.1.1 EMPLOYMENT SAMPLE
For the EMPLOYMENT SAMPLE our deﬁnition aims at including all workers who supplied some hours of work
and who were in the education by experience sample as the one used for Census data. The relevant eliminations
made in the main sample where:
1) Eliminate people living in group quarters (military or convicts), which are those with the gq variable
equal to 0, 3 or 4.
2) Eliminate people younger than 18.
3) Eliminate those who worked 0 weeks last year which corresponds to wkswork2=0 until 1975 and
wkswork1=0 after 1975. Eliminate those who worked 0 hours by omitting hrswork=0 until 1975 and uhrswork=0
after 1975.
4) Once we calculate experience as age-(time ﬁrst worked), where (time ﬁrst worked) is 17 for workers
with no HS degree, 19 for HS graduates, 21 for workers with some college education and 23 for college graduates,
we eliminate all those with experience <1a n d>40.
Construction of the hours worked and employment by education group and year
We ﬁrst calculate the total amount of hours worked by sex-education-experience cell in each year by adding
up the hours worked by each person in the cell, multiplied by her personal weight (PERWT). Then we calculate
the average weekly wage in each of the four education groups (SHS, HSG, SCO, COG) over the 1963-2006
period and we sum up in each education group-year the hours worked by each experience-sex group scaled by the
average (1963-2006) weekly wages of the group relative to males with 10-15 years of experience. This converts
hours worked to equivalent hours assuming that diﬀerent groups have diﬀerent labor eﬀectiveness. We use the
same procedure to calculate employment in each education group per year.
C.1.2 WAGE SAMPLE
The construction of the Wage sample follows these steps:
a) Apply the same elimination as for the Employment sample
b) Eliminate those workers who do not report valid salary income (999999) or report 0.
c) Eliminate the self-employed (keep those for whom variable CLASSWKR is between 20 and 28).
Construction of the average weekly wage by education cell in each year.
In each of the sex-education-experience cells in each year we average the weekly wage of individuals, each
weighted by the hours worked by the individual. Then we aggregate the average wage of each cell within the
50four education groups for each year by weighting the average weekly wage in the sex-education-experience cells
by the average (1963-2006) hours worked by the education-experience-sex group relative to the total of the
education group. This keeps the composition constant within the education group when calculating average
wages.
C.2 Individual Variables Deﬁnition and Construction
Education:W ed e ﬁned four education groups: Some High School (SHS), High School Graduates (HSG), Some
College (SCO) and College Graduates (COG). All groups in each year are deﬁned using the variable EDUCREC
which was built in order to consistently reﬂect the variables HIGRADE and EDUC99. In particular, we deﬁne
as SHS those with EDUCREC<=6, then HSG are those with EDUCREC=7, SCO are those with EDUCREC=8
and COG are those with EDUCREC=9.
Experience: Deﬁned as potential experience, assigning to each schooling group a certain age reﬂecting the
start of their working life; in particular, the initial working ages are: 16 years for SHS, 19 years for HSG, 21
years for SCO and 23 years for COG.
Weeks Worked in a Year: For the CPS up to1975 the variable used to deﬁn ew e e k sw o r k e di nt h el a s t
year is WKSWORK2, which deﬁnes weeks worked in intervals. We choose the median value for each interval
so that we impute to individuals weeks worked in the previous year according to the following criteria:
6.5 weeks if wkswork2=1; 20 weeks if wkswork2=2; 33 weeks if wkswork2=3; 43.5 weeks if wkswork2=4;
48.5 weeks if wkswork2=5; 51 weeks if wkswork2==6.
For the CPS after 1975 we use the variable wkswork1 which records the exact number of weeks worked last
year.
Hours Worked in a Week: For the CPS up to 1975 we use hrswork, which records the number of hours
worked last week, and after 1975 we use uhrswork which records the exact number of hours worked in a usual
week by a person.
H o u r sW o r k e di naY e a r :This is the measure of labor supply by an individual and it is obtained
multiplying Hours Worked in a Week by Weeks Worked in a Year, as deﬁned above.
Yearly Wages: The yearly wage in current US $ is calculated as the variable INCWAGE
Weekly Wages: The weekly wage for an individual is constructed by dividing the yearly wage as deﬁned
above by the number of weeks worked in a year, as deﬁned above.
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1 to 5 years  8.5% 0.7%
6 to 10 years  21.0% -1.5%
11 to 15 years  25.9% 0.6%
16 to 20 years  31.0% 1.6%
21 to 25 years  35.7% 1.3%
26 to 30 years  28.9% -1.6%
31 to 35 years  21.9% -8.8%
36 to 40 years  14.3% -10.1%
No High School Degree 
All Experience groups  23.6% -3.1%
1 to 5 years  6.7% -5.3%
6 to 10 years  7.7% -1.6%
11 to 15 years  8.7% -1.4%
16 to 20 years  12.1% 1.8%
21 to 25 years  13.0% 0.6%
26 to 30 years  11.8% -0.9%
31 to 35 years  11.0% -2.0%
36 to 40 years  9.3% -4.0%
All Experience groups  10.0% -1.2%
High School Degree 
 
High School Degree or Less  All Experience groups  13.2% -1.5%
    
1 to 5 years  2.6% -5.4%
6 to 10 years  2.6% -2.0%
11 to 15 years  3.9% 0.1%
16 to 20 years  6.2% 0.6%
21 to 25 years  8.4% -2.5%
26 to 30 years  12.0% -3.1%
31 to 35 years  12.3% -3.8%
36 to 40 years  12.7% -3.0%
Some College Education 
All Experience groups  6.0% -1.9%
1 to 5 years  6.8% 0.4%
6 to 10 years  12.2% 6.5%
11 to 15 years  13.7% 14.2%
16 to 20 years  12.2% 17.3%
21 to 25 years  17.5% 9.1%
26 to 30 years  24.4% 4.3%
31 to 35 years  26.1% 1.7%
36 to 40 years   
All Experience groups  14.6% 9.3%
College Degree 
 
Some College and  More  All Experience groups  10.0% 4.5%  53
Table 2 
Estimates of (-1/σIMMI), National Census and ACS, U.S. data 1960-2006 



























































































































Included fixed effects: 
Education by Experience effects 
(32 in total) 
No  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Effects  
(6 in total) 
No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Year by Experience Effects 
(48 in total) 
No No No  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Year by Education Fixed effects 
(24 in total) 
No No No  No  Yes  Yes   
Note: Each cell reports the estimate of the parameter -1/σIMMI. The estimated specification in column (2) is exactly as in equation (14) in the main text. The other 
specifications omit or include other dummies. Column (6) reports the estimates from Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) where available. Each observation in a 
regression represents one of 32 education-experience cells over a considered year (1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2006). The dependent variable is the logarithm 
of the relative foreign-native average wage in the cell. The average wage for each group in the cell is the hours-weighted average weekly wage including individuals 
working at least one week, not self-employed and earning positive salary. The explanatory variable is the logarithm of the relative foreign-native labor supplied by 
individuals in the cell measured as hours worked by individuals not in group quarters. In the fourth row we instrument relative hours worked with relative 
employment. Each observation is weighted in the regression by the number of observations (employment) in the cell. In parenthesis we report the heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, clustered over the 32 education-experience groups. ***= significant at 1% level; **=significant at 5% level; *= significant at 10% level.   54
Table 3 
Estimates of (-1/σIMMI), National Census and ACS, U.S. data 1960-2006 



























































































































Included fixed effects: 
Education by Experience effects 
(32 in total) 
No  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Effects  
(6 in total) 
No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Year by Experience Effects 
(48 in total) 
No No No  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Year by Education Fixed effects 
(24 in total) 
No No No  No  Yes  Yes   
Note: Each cell reports the estimate of the parameter -1/σIMMI. The estimated specification in column (2) is exactly as in equation (14) in the main text. The other 
specifications omit or include other dummies. Column (6) reports the corresponding estimates from Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) where available. Each 
observation in a regression represents one of 32 education-experience cells over a considered year (1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2006). The dependent variable 
is the logarithm of the relative foreign-native average wage. The average wage for each group in the cell is the hour-weighted average weekly wage including 
individuals working at least one week, not self-employed, not attending school and earning positive salary. The explanatory variable is the logarithm of the relative 
foreign-native labor supplied by individuals in the cell, measured as hours worked. In the fourth row we instrument relative hours worked with relative employment. 
Each observation is weighted by the number of observations (employment) in the cell. In parenthesis we include the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, 
clustered over the 32 education-experience groups.  ***= significant at 1% level; **=significant at 5% level; *= significant at 10% level.   55
 
Table 4 














































Pooled Men and Women 

















Included fixed effects: 
Education by Experience Effects  
(32 in total) 
Yes Yes Yes   
Year by Education Fixed Effects 
(24 in total) 
Yes Yes Yes   
Year by Experience Effects 
(48 in total) 
No No Yes   
Note: Each cell reports the estimate of the parameter -1/σEXP. Each observation represents one of 32 education-experience cells over one of the considered years 
(1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2006). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average weekly wage of native and immigrant workers in the cell (Men, 
Women or Pooled M-W depending on the row) constructed as the hours-weighted average weekly wage including all individuals working at least one week, not 
self-employed and earning positive salary. The explanatory variable is the logarithm of the labor composite Nkjt whose construction is described in the text. In 
constructing Nkjt we use hours worked as a measure of individual labor supply (except in the fourth row where we use employment). The method of estimation is 
2SLS using the logarithm of labor supplied by foreign-born workers (in hours or in employment) in the cell ln(Fkjt) as an instrument for total labor supply ln(Nkjt ) in 
the cell. Each observation is weighted by the cell employment. The Basic specification is as equation 917) in the text. In parenthesis we include the 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered over the 32 education-experience groups.  
***= significant at 1% level; **=significant at 5% level; *= significant at 10% level. 
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Table 5 




Note: Each cell reports the estimate of the parameter -1/σEDU. Each observation represents one of four education cells in each of the considered years (1960, 1970, 
1980, 1990, 2000 and 2006). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average weekly wage of native and immigrant workers in the cell (Men, Women or 
Pooled M-W depending on the row) constructed as an hour-weighted average weekly wage including all individuals working at least one week, not self-employed 
and earning positive salary. The explanatory variable is the logarithm of the labor composite Nkt whose construction is described in the text. In constructing Nkj we 
use hours worked as a measure of individual labor supply (except in the fourth row where we use employment). The method of estimation is 2SLS using the 
logarithm of labor supplied by foreign-born workers (in hours or in employment) in the cell, ln(Fkt) as an instrument for total labor supply ln(Nkt )in the cell. Each 
observation is weighted by the cell employment. The basic specification is as specified in equation (20) in the text. In parenthesis we include the heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, clustered over the four education groups.  
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Pooled Men and Women 





















Included fixed effects 
Education-Specific Time Trend  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Common Year -Fixed Effects   No  No  Yes  No   
Education-Specific Fixed Effect  No  No  No  Yes     57
 
 
 Table 6 
Estimates of (-1/σHL),  (-1/σHH), and (-1/σLL) CPS, U.S. data 1963-2006,  






Note: Each cell is the estimate from a separate regression on yearly CPS data. In the first column we estimate the relative wage elasticity of the group of workers 
with a high school degree or less relative to those with some college or more. Method and construction of the relative supply (hours worked) and relative average 
weekly wages are described in the text and identical to Katz and Murphy (1992). In the first row we split workers with some college education between H and L. 
In the second row we include them in group H, following the CES nesting in our model. In the second column we consider only the groups of workers with no 
degree and those with a high school degree (the dependent variable is relative wages and the explanatory is relative hours worked). In the third column we 
consider only workers with some college education and workers with a college degree or more (the dependent variable is relative wages and the explanatory is 
relative hours worked). In brackets are the standard errors and in square brackets the Newey-West autocorrelation-robust standard errors. 




  (1) 
Estimates of  
-1/σHL 
(2) 
Estimates of  
-1/σLL 
(3) 




        
Pooled Men and Women 






Pooled Men and Women 









[0.10]  44 
Pooled Men and Women 
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Table 7 
Simulated Wage Effects of Immigrants, 1990-2006: 
 Long Run Effects 
  Parameters From the Existing 
Labor Literature 
Parameters from Existing  Labor 
Literature and  
σIMMI from Our Estimates 






















σHL  1.4 2  1.5  1.4 2  1.5  1.4 2  2 2.4 
σHH   ∞   ∞   ∞   ∞   ∞   ∞   10 10 10 2.4 
σLL    ∞   ∞   ∞   ∞   ∞   ∞   10 50 20 2.4 
σEXP  3.3 10  5  3.3 10  5  6.2 7.7 7 3 
σIMMI  ∞   ∞   ∞   15 30 20  20 20 20  ∞  
% Real Wage Change of US-Born Workers Due to Immigration, 1990-2006 
Less than HS  -0.6% -0.5% -0.5%  +1.0% +0.5% +0.7%  -0.3 +0.6  +0.3 -4.7% 
HS graduates  -0.3% -0.2% -0.3%  +0.3% +0.1% +0.2%  +0.4 +0.3 +0.4 +0.9% 
Some CO  +0.1% +0.1% +0.1%  +0.6% +0.3% +0.5%  +1.0 +0.1 +0.9 +2.2% 
CO graduates  +0.1% +0.1% +0.1%  +1.1% +0.6% +0.9%  +0.5 +0.5 +0.5% -1.7% 
Average US-born   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%  +0.8% +0.4% +0.6  +0.6% +0.6  +0.6% +0.1% 
% Real Wage Change of Foreign-Born Workers Due to Immigration, 1990-2006 
Less than HS  -0.6% -0.5%  -0.5%  -6.1% -3.0% -4.6%  -5.6% -4.7% -4.9% -4.7% 
HS graduates  -0.3% -0.2%  -0.3%  -9.8% -5.1% -7.4%  -7.2% -7.3% -7.0% +0.9% 
Some CO  +0.1% +0.1%  +0.1%  -6.1% -3.1% -4.5%  -4.0% -4.1% -4.0% +2.2% 
CO graduates  +0.1% +0.1%  +0.1%  -9.2% -5.0% -7.6%  -8.0% -8.0% -8.1% -1.7% 
Average Foreign-born  +0.0%   0.0%   0.0%  -8.6% -4.3% -6.4%  -6.6% -6.5% -6.4% -0.8% 
Overall average   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0% 
 
Note: The percentage wage changes for each education group are obtained averaging the wage change of each education-experience group (calculated using the 
formulas in the text) weighted by its wage share in the education group. The US-born and Foreign-born average changes are obtained weighting changes of each 
education group by its share in the 1990 wage bill of the group. The overall average wage change adds the change of US- and foreign-born weighted for the relative 
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Table 8 
Simulated Wage Effects of Immigrants, 1990-2006: 
 Short Run Effects 
 
Note: The simulations in the first four columns use the parameter estimates of column 9 in Table 7. The last column uses the parameter estimates of Borjas and Katz 
(2007), reported in column 10 of Table 7. The adjustment of the capital-labor ratio relative to its long run trend is estimated yearly using the actual inflow of 




 1  2  3  4  5 
  As of 2007 
(short run) 
As of 2012 
(medium run) 




Short Run in 
Borjas and Katz 
(2007) and 
Borjas (2003)  
 
% Real Wage Change of US-Born Workers Due to Immigration, 1990-2006 
Less than HS  -0.7% -0.3% 0.3%  -2.8%  -7.8% 
HS graduates  -0.6% -0.2% 0.4%  -2.7%  -2.2% 
Some CO  0.0% 0.4% 0.9%  -2.1%  -0.9% 
CO graduates  -0.5% -0.1% 0.5%  -2.6% -4.7% 
Average, US-Born  -0.4% 0.0% 0.6%  -2.5%  -3.0% 
% Real Wage Change of Foreign-Born Workers Due to Immigration, 1990-2006 
Less than HS  -6.0% -5.6% -4.9%  -8.1%  -7.8% 
HS graduates  -8.2% -7.8% -7.0%  -10.3%  -2.2% 
Some CO  -5.1% -4.7% -4.0%  -7.2%  -0.9% 
CO graduates  -9.0% -8.6% -8.1%  -11.1%  -4.7% 
Average Foreign-born  -7.5% -7.1% -6.4%  -9.6%  -3.0% 
Overall Average:  
Native and US-Born 
-1.1% -0.6% 0.0%  -3.2%  -3.2%   60
Figures 
Figure 1 




































y capital/output ratio in the U.S.
average
 




























































Source: Authors’ calculations using BEA data on the Stock of Physical Capital and BLS data on total non-
farm employment.    61
 
Figure 3 

















Young (experience below 20 years)
Old (Experience above 20 years)
 

























Young (experience below 20 years)
Old (Experience above 20 years)
 
Note: Percentage changes in real weekly wages for U.S.-born workers, 1990-2006, by education 
and experience group. 
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Figure 5 
Correlation between relative Immigrant-Native wages and hours worked.  


















































Note:  Each observation corresponds to an education-experience group in one of the considered years (1960, 1970, 1980, 
1990, 2000, 2006) The horizontal axis measures the logarithm of the relative hours worked in the group by male immigrants/ 
natives and the vertical axis measure the logarithm of the relative weekly wage paid to male immigrants/ natives. 
 
Figure 6 
Partial correlation between relative Immigrant-Native wages and hours worked 
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Ln(Immigrant hours/Native hours)
Education_Experience-Year Groups
WLS (with fixed effects) regression line
 
Note:  Each observation corresponds to an education-experience group in one of the considered years (1960, 1970, 1980, 
1990, 2000, 2006) The scatter-plot reports the residuals of log relative wages and log relative hours of male immigrant/natives 




Standard Error=0.008   63
Table Appendix 
Table A1: 
Percentage of Total Hours Worked by Foreign-Born by Group 1960-2006 











































Note: Sample and method of construction of hours worked are described in the text. The data are from Ruggles et al. 
(2008) 
Group Year 
Education  Experience  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 
1 to 5  3.4%  4.9%  8.8% 19.4% 27.3% 31.3% 
6 to 10  4.1%  5.6% 13.8% 28.6% 46.2% 46.0% 
11 to 15  3.9%  6.6% 15.6% 27.4% 47.4% 56.0% 
16 to 20  4.5%  6.9% 13.2% 28.6% 45.0% 56.1% 
21 to 25  4.5%  6.5% 12.6% 27.9% 39.7% 52.6% 
26 to 30  5.3%  5.9% 11.5% 21.0% 39.5% 46.0% 









6.2%  6.0%  11.2% 23.2% 39.0% 47.6% 
1 to 5  1.5% 2.5% 3.2% 6.7%  11.6%  13.5% 
6 to 10  1.9% 2.7% 3.8% 6.9%  14.1%  17.4% 
11 to 15  2.3% 3.2% 4.6% 6.5%  13.3%  20.6% 
16 to 20  3.3% 3.3% 4.5% 7.0%  10.9%  18.5% 
21 to 25  3.0% 3.5% 5.0% 7.4% 9.7%  14.9% 
26 to 30  4.7% 4.1% 4.8% 6.9% 9.7%  11.8% 
31 to 35  6.7% 3.5% 5.0% 7.0% 9.6%  11.7% 
High School 
Graduates 





3.5% 3.3% 4.3% 6.9%  10.9%  14.9% 
1 to 5  2.6% 3.3% 4.5% 6.4% 8.4% 8.8% 
6 to 10  3.6% 4.6% 5.0% 7.0% 9.3%  11.2% 
11 to 15  4.2% 5.5% 5.8% 6.5% 9.8%  11.7% 
16 to 20  4.6% 5.4% 6.5% 6.2% 9.2%  12.2% 
21 to 25  4.7% 5.1% 6.8% 6.6% 8.1%  10.5% 
26 to 30  5.2% 5.1% 6.4% 7.2% 7.4% 9.4% 









4.9% 4.7% 5.6% 6.7% 8.5%  10.2% 
1 to 5  3.1% 3.8% 4.4% 7.1%  11.8%  11.8% 
6 to 10  4.1% 6.5% 6.5% 8.9%  13.7%  18.8% 
11 to 15  4.6% 6.2% 8.4% 9.2%  14.6%  18.2% 
16 to 20  4.4%  5.7% 10.0%  8.9% 13.3% 17.5% 
21 to 25  5.4% 5.5% 8.4% 9.9%  11.4%  15.5% 
26 to 30  6.7%  5.5%  7.3% 11.1% 10.4% 13.8% 
31 to 35  8.4% 6.4% 7.3% 9.4%  11.0%  11.4% 






5.2% 5.7% 7.1% 9.0%  12.5%  15.3%   64
 
Table A2: 
Weekly Wages of U.S. Natives in Constant 2000 U.S. $ by group, 1960-2006 






Note: Sample and method of construction of weekly wages (in constant 2000 U.S. $) are described in the text. The data 
are from Ruggles et al. (2008). 
Group Year 
Education Experience 1960  1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 
1 to 5  304  360  336 265 280 266 
6 to 10  417  514  474 400 413 394 
11 to 15  480  581  527 460 471 463 
16 to 20  507  601  578 495 511 503 
21 to 25  507  624  611 521 540 527 
26 to 30  507  637  624 557 561 548 









485 589 562 485 489 474 
1 to 5  395 472 453 377 382 357 
6 to 10  523 642 572 501 509 493 
11 to 15  580 709 640 572 569 564 
16 to 20  609 730 702 613 627 623 
21 to 25  628 739 720 640 658 644 
26 to 30  623 742 734 681 673 675 
31 to 35  621 750 738 687 679 674 
High School 
Graduates 





568 679 635 580 601 591 
1 to 5  477 565 507 452 451 428 
6 to 10  620 768 656 605 603 593 
11 to 15  704 865 765 698 703 698 
16 to 20  744 914 839 755 769 760 
21 to 25  769 946 860 815 808 795 
26 to 30  757 961 883 858 835 831 









690 825 723 698 728 717 
1 to 5  613 787 645 685 720 687 
6 to 10  804  1041  869 927 979 987 
11 to 15  937  1235 1116 1097 1259 1252 
16 to 20  1037 1350 1258 1212 1386 1422 
21 to 25  1060 1423 1336 1345 1392 1467 
26 to 30  1042 1404 1357 1386 1412 1446 
31 to 35  1065 1353 1350 1400 1491 1423 











Relative Weekly Wages of Foreign-Born/ US-Born Workers by group, 1960-2006 
























































Note: Sample and method of construction of  weekly wages (in constant 2000 U.S. $) are described in the text. The data 
are from Ruggles et al. (2008). 
 
Group Year 
Education Experience  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 
1 to 5  1.09 1.05 1.03 1.13 1.18 1.10 
6 to 10  0.98 0.96 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.87 
11 to 15  1.01 1.03 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.81 
16 to 20  1.01 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.82 
21 to 25  1.05 0.99 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.81 
26 to 30  1.03 0.99 0.90 0.88 0.86 0.79 




36 to 40  1.07 1.01 0.91 0.90 0.82 0.84 
  All Experience 
Levels 
1.04 1.01 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.86 
1 to 5  0.98 1.01 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.95 
6 to 10  0.94 0.98 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.86 
11 to 15  0.93 0.99 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.84 
16 to 20  1.03 0.98 0.91 0.96 0.91 0.83 
21 to 25  1.01 0.98 0.92 0.97 0.89 0.86 
26 to 30  1.07 1.02 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.85 




36 to 40  1.04 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.91 0.89 
  All Experience 
Levels 
1.02 1.00 0.93 0.95 0.92 0.86 
1 to 5  0.93 0.96 0.96 1.02 1.02 0.99 
6 to 10  0.92 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.93 
11 to 15  0.94 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.91 
16 to 20  0.96 0.95 0.92 0.98 0.95 0.95 
21 to 25  1.03 0.93 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.90 
26 to 30  1.04 0.87 0.91 0.95 0.96 0.93 




36 to 40  1.04 1.11 0.97 0.98 0.92 0.94 
  All Experience 
Levels 
1.01 0.96 0.94 0.98 0.96 0.93 
1 to 5  0.96 0.92 0.98 0.99 1.15 1.08 
6 to 10  0.85 0.89 0.98 0.93 1.06 1.03 
11 to 15  0.93 0.93 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.98 
16 to 20  0.95 0.94 0.99 1.02 0.94 0.92 
21 to 25  1.02 0.97 0.98 1.01 0.96 0.89 
26 to 30  1.04 0.89 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.90 
31 to 35  0.88 0.93 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.89 





0.96 0.93 0.98 0.98 1.01 0.96   66
Table A4 
Estimates of σIMMI, National U.S. data, 1960-2006 
Wage Sample: All people who worked for wages except the self-employed, weighted by hours worked 
 
Specification No  Fixed 
Effects 
Basic Plus  Time 
Effects 
Plus Time by 
Experience effects 




          








































































































Fixed Effects Included: 
Education by Experience effects 
(32 in total) 
No  Yes Yes Yes  Yes   
Year Effects  
(6 in total) 
No No Yes  Yes  Yes   
Year by Experience Effects 
(56 in total) 
No No No Yes  Yes   
Year by Education Fixed effects 
(24 in total) 
No No No No  Yes   
Note: This table presents the same specifications as rows 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Table 2 and estimates them on the sample of men and women (separately) rather than on the 
pooled sample as in Table 2.  
In parenthesis we report the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered over the 32 education-experience groups.  












Estimates of (-1/σHL), (-1/σHH), and (-1/σLL) CPS, U.S. data 1963-2006,  



















Note: Variables, definitions and regressions as in Table 6. The only difference is that the sample used to construct wages is limited to men only.  In 
brackets are the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and in square brackets the Newey-West autocorrelation-robust standard errors. 




  Estimates of  
-1/σHL 
Estimates of  
-1/σLL 




        
Men Only 















[0.11]  44 
Men Only 
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